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Abstract
In my PhD dissertation, I have four essays on research topics related to interna-
tional economics. These essays utilize some of the different economic tools and
skill sets (that I have acquired during my graduate-school study experience in
Australia, United States, and United Kingdom), to tackle the economic problems
that I am interested in, so as to better understand the economics and economic
policies in the real world.
Chapter 2:
Monetary Policy and Fiscal Rules for a Two-State Open Economy.
Chapter 3:
Business Cycle Synchronization between the Great Britain and the United States.
Chapter 4:
Oil Supply Shocks in a Non-Scale Economic Growth Model.
Chapter 5:
Canada’s Loss of External Competitiveness: The Role of Commodity Prices and
the Emergence of China
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Chapter1
Introduction
In this introductory chapter, I outline the abstract of each essay in order to give
an overview of my dissertation.
Ch2: Monetary Policy & Fiscal Rules for a Two-State Open Economy
The seemingly never-ending economic woes of Euro Zone economies have been in
the media coverage for a while, which makes us to cast doubt again on the optimal-
ity of the Euro Zone. The problem lies in the very different behavior of member
economies, to which a contributing factor is the “one-size-fits-all” monetary policy
that is imposed by a currency union. In order to understand better what is going
on, this research project develops a two-state open economy DSGE model, in which
the two state economies conduct the same monetary policy but retain their fiscal
independence. In this constructed DSGE model, the central monetary authority
has the policy instrument of the nominal interest rate. In each economy, the fis-
cal authority can levy non-distorting lump-sum tax transfer, and issue nominal
risk-free debt, so as to finance a given process of public spending in their own econ-
omy. This DSGE model is calibrated to distinguish one state from the other. The
(international) linkages between the two state economies are inter-state trade in
goods, and inter-state bond borrowing. We investigate the macroeconomic effects
of monetary policy where there is a single currency by considering two economic
scenarios: a supply-side shock (such as a productivity increase), and a demand-
side shock (such as a government expenditure increase) in the Home economy.
The policy implications from this project are that monetary policy is wrong if in-
flation differentials persist. The wrong monetary policy would lead to too low real
interest rates for high inflation countries, which would be indebted with too much
borrowing. Markets are taking note of this by charging much higher risk premium.
2Ch3: Business Cycle Synchronization between the UK and the US
In this chapter, I take up the research topic of business cycle synchronization be-
tween the Great Britain and the United States. In order to explore this topic,
I examine the relationship between the UK and US economies for the past five
decades. The measurement of the synchronization between these two economies is
done by dating their business cycles and finding the turning points in their cycles.
A GMM analytical framework is adopted, due to the need for a model that is free
in measuring synchronization, and also the need for estimates that are robust to
serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. Under this GMM framework, I conduct
single and joint synchronization tests between the UK and US for each type of
business cycles, and I find the US leads the UK for all three types of business cycles.
Ch4: Oil Supply Shocks in a Non-Scale Economic Growth Model
This research project extends Schubert and Turnovsky (2007) paper by intro-
ducing endogenous labor supply into their model economy, and investigates the
dynamic effects of a one-time unanticipated permanent change in the price of the
imported intermediate good on economic growth. The growth model considered
here is a “non-scale” growth model, in which the economy has access to a per-
fect capital market. With the extension of endogenous labor supply, we find that
output, capital, and input usage are all permanently much lower than the case
for fixed labor supply. The short-run impacts on input usage and output are also
larger than those in the fixed labor supply case.
Ch5: Canada’s Loss of External Competitiveness, (joint with P. Medas1)
After booming in the 1990s, Canadian exports have waned over the past decade.
The loss of external competitiveness has been quite evident in the US market
(the main destination of Canadian exports), where Canada has been overtaken by
China as the leading exporter to the US. Using a dynamic panel data of Canadian
merchandise exports across different sectors in the US market, we identify the
main driving forces behind the weakening export performance in Canada, which
include the slowdown in the US demand and the emergence of China as a major
exporter. The appreciation of the Canadian loonie over the past decade, in part
reflecting the rise in commodity prices, has also played a key role in explaining
the loss of Canadian exporters share in the US market.
1Paulo Medas is a Senior Economist at the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Chapter2
Monetary Policy and Fiscal Rules for
a Two-State Open Economy
Abstract
The seemingly never-ending economic woes of Euro Zone economies have been in
the media coverage for a while, which makes us to cast doubt again on the optimal-
ity of the Euro Zone. The problem lies in the very different behavior of member
economies, to which a contributing factor is the “one-size-fits-all” monetary policy
that is imposed by a currency union. In order to understand better what is going
on, this research project develops a two-state open economy DSGE model, in which
the two state economies conduct the same monetary policy but retain their fiscal
independence. In this constructed DSGE model, the central monetary authority
has the policy instrument of the nominal interest rate. In each economy, the fis-
cal authority can levy non-distorting lump-sum tax transfer, and issue nominal
risk-free debt, so as to finance a given process of public spending in their own econ-
omy. This DSGE model is calibrated to distinguish one state from the other. The
(international) linkages between the two state economies are inter-state trade in
goods, and inter-state bond borrowing. We investigate the macroeconomic effects
of monetary policy where there is a single currency by considering two economic
scenarios: a supply-side shock (such as a productivity increase), and a demand-
side shock (such as a government expenditure increase) in the Home economy.
The policy implications from this project are that monetary policy is wrong if in-
flation differentials persist. The wrong monetary policy would lead to real interest
rates too low for high inflation countries, which would be indebted with too much
borrowing. Markets are taking note of this by charging much higher risk premium.
4JEL Classification: E44, E47, E51, E52, E58, E61, E63, F41, F42, F47.
Key Words: Currency Union, Monetary Policy, Inflation, Interest Rate, Exchange
Rate, Current Account, Fiscal Policy, DSGE (Dynamic Stochastic General Equi-
librium) Modeling, Euro Zone.
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Motivation
The economic woes of Euro Zone economies seem never-ending. Would things
get even worse before they get better? Or would they ever get better? All the
media coverage on the Euro Zone debt crisis makes us to cast doubt again on the
optimality of the Euro Zone. Similar concerns are also raised in Wyplosz (2006),
and Goodhart (2007a, 2007b). Wickens (2010) points out that at the inception of
the Euro Zone, the member countries were not suited to be an optimal currency
area. Reasons include difference in productivity levels, real wage rates, the degree
of stickiness in wages and prices, fiscal deficits, inflation, and government debt.
These would cause countries to have very different economic performances.
The theory of the optimal currency area (OCA) was pioneered by economist
Robert Mundell (1961), who is also often credited as the father of the Euro. The
benefits of forming an OCA include lower and more stable inflation rate, lower
interest rates, and increased trade. On the other hand, the costs of forming an
OCA include no independence of monetary policy, and less ability to respond to
shocks. To economists, an “optimal currency area” is one in which the gains from
sharing a single currency outweigh the costs. There is some debate as to whether
the Euro area qualifies though.
In the case of the Euro zone, Germany already had lower inflation rate and lower
interest rate before the formation of the Euro Zone; so Germany is in the currency
union for political reason, but not for economic reason. In the Euro area, the size
and the correlation of shocks are very different across different economies in the
same common currency union. Take Germany and Greece as an example. They
have a very different size of their economies. Their difference is based upon differ-
ent exports and imports, different industrial structures, different specializations,
5different wages, different union structures, etc. As a result, it would not at all
unexpected for Germany to be booming at a time when Greece was in recession,
or vice versa. Given that the shocks would be very different in nature and have
different impact on each economy in the currency area, how much control over
the common monetary policy will individual countries have? In the case of the
Euro, there is very little control by the periphery countries. Germany is likely to
dominate, which is in part by “design”, as Germany has the best monetary policy
to begin with, and it is also dominant in terms of its GDP size. Because of that,
the European Central Bank (ECB) was built from the very beginning to respond
less to shocks in periphery countries. In order to adjust to shocks, there should
be ways other than internal devaluation to respond to shocks, which include labor
mobility and fiscal equalization. Labor mobility is already controversial in the Eu-
rope; and fiscal equalization works in the US, but not in Europe. So the creation
of the Euro was about politics and ideology, not a response to careful economic
analysis.
2.1.2 Model Overview
Against this backdrop, we develop a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
(DSGE) model for a two-state open economy, in which the two economies have
the same monetary policy but independent fiscal policy. Real world examples
include two countries in the Euro Zone, two states in the US economy, core and
periphery countries, etc. In such economies, the two states have a fixed exchange
rate and a common nominal interest rate as set by the central monetary authority,
but they have different inflation rates in each individual economy. On the fiscal
side, each state economy retains its fiscal independence by having its own fiscal
authority which can levy non-distorting lump-sum tax transfer, and issue nominal
risk-free debt in order to finance a given process of public spending in their state
economy. The fiscal authority can also respond to the excessive change in the
debt level, with a fiscal policy rule. On top of that, the linkages between these
two state economies are: inter-state trade in goods, and inter-state borrowing in
bonds.
2.1.3 Research Questions
The research questions addressed in this project derive from the interaction of
monetary policy and fiscal rules in a currency union when each economy within
6the union has different economic situations, such as the Euro Zone economies
nowadays. This research project seeks to answer the following two major research
questions, which are outlined as follows:
Research Question (1): Is it appropriate for two economies to be in a currency
union, if the two economies are different in economic size and have different in-
flation rates? What are the macroeconomic consequences of this inappropriate
monetary policy under a currency union?
Research Question (2): Will both of the two economies be better off, if they are
allowed to have their own monetary authority and conduct their own independent
monetary policy, instead of having a common nominal interest rate as set by a
central monetary authority?
2.1.4 Roadmap
Looking ahead, the rest of this chapter is structured as follows: In Section 2.2,
we develop a two-state open economy DSGE model as our analytical framework,
in which we model the consumers, firms, monetary authority, fiscal authority,
and a trade sector in our currency union. In Section 2.3, we apply our DSGE
model and conduct two economic experiments: a supply-side shock (for example, a
productivity shock, or a migration shock), and a demand-side shock (for example,
a government expenditure shock) in the Home economy. Based on our model
estimates, we start from the impulse-response functions for the different types of
shocks, and review the major implications from the domestic and open-economy
variables for the supply and demand shocks that are present in the model. The
joint behavior of the domestic variables and the open-economy variables (those
linking the two economies) should be informative to identify the major impact
of the shocks over this period. We conduct our two economic experiments under
two monetary policy regime: a single currency regime, and a two-currency regime.
Section 2.4 offers our conclusion for this chapter.
2.2 Analytical Framework
Calibrated Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models offer rig-
orous theoretical microeconomic foundations to tackle macroeconomic questions
7and policy issues. A number of two-country and multi-country DSGE models
have emerged, for example, de Walque et al. (2005), Cristadoro et al. (2006),
and IMF’s GEM1, GFM2, GPM3 models,4 and GIMF5 models. Large scale multi-
country DSGE models are rare, which is due to the complexity of the economic
modeling required to deliver the rich microeconomic foundations that are con-
sidered as the principal advantage of DSGE models. Global DSGE models with
broad coverage are still some way off.
Following the footsteps of Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007), there has been an
extensive literature which uses DSGE models to study the policy impacts and the
stabilizing role played by monetary rules. Given the rising attention paid to fiscal
policy, especially during the Euro Zone crisis, this research project contributes to
the literature exploring the roles played by the joint conduct of monetary policy
and fiscal policy in a DSGE framework for a currency union.
In the existing literature, Gali and Monacelli (2008) develop a tractable/analytical
model for the analysis of optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a currency union,
where monetary policy is in the form of a common interest rate at the union level,
and fiscal policy is in the form of government spending rule at the country level.
Ratto, Roeger, and Veld (2008) develop a DSGE open-economy model featured by
nominal and real frictions, as well as financial frictions with liquidity constraints,
and then they study the stabilization of monetary and fiscal policy rules, and esti-
mate the model on Euro area data using Bayesian estimation techniques. On the
other hand, Valli and Carvalho (2010) model a fiscal rule with primary balance
targets to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio in a two-country open-economy New
Keynesian DSGE model, with a forward-looking Taylor rule consistent with an
inflation targeting regime.
Starting from first principles, we build our DSGE model from an economist’s
point of view, in the form of a macroeconomic model with microeconomic founda-
tion, and with as few restrictive assumptions as possible. Our DSGE model and
the various assumptions that it is built on are used to arrive at a simplified, but
1GEM = Global Economy Model.
2GFM = Global Fiscal Model.
3GPM = Global Projection Model.
4See Bayoumi (2004), Botman et al. (2007), Carabenciov et al. (2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2013).
5GIMF = Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal Model.
8internally consistent view of the linkages in our “two-state” open economy. But
our model is not meant to fully capture the real world. Instead, it is an abstrac-
tion of the reality, and it is to be used for cross checks in conjunction with our
judgment and experience.
In our analytical framework for a currency union, we model consumers, firms,
a central monetary authority, two separate fiscal authorities, and a trade sector.
Building from that, we derive their behavioral equations explicitly from the inter-
temporal optimization of our agents under budget constraint, technological con-
straint, and institutional constraint. Given these constraints, our representative
agents “rationally” solve their constrained optimization problems, and “optimally”
respond to the supply and demand shocks occurring in different markets, which
are the cause of macroeconomic fluctuations in the economy. The behavioral equa-
tions describing aggregate variables are thus replaced by first-order conditions of
our inter-temporal problems facing consumers, firms, and government. As a re-
sponse, monetary policy and fiscal policy can play a role in alleviating the impact
of these shocks, the extent of which can be studied by DSGE modeling and simu-
lation, as a central tool for our macroeconomic analysis.
2.2.1 Household
To model the household, we adopt a “representative agent” approach, by which
we assume that there are a large number of identical/homogeneous agents in our
model economy.
2.2.1.1 Inter-temporal Utility
We assume that our representative agent has an inter-temporal utility function,
in which he derives positive utility from the goods that he consumes6.
U(Ci,t) = Et
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt
(Ci,t)
1−σ − 1
1− σ
]
(2.1)
where: 1) The utility function U(.) is bounded, continuously differentiable, strictly
increasing, and strictly concave. 2) The subscript index i = 1, 2, are State 1
(Home) and State 2 (Foreign), respectively. 3) Ci,t is the level of consumption, to
6The consumption part of the utility function is a power utility, which is also known as the
iso-elastic utility. With this utility form, the agent has constant relative risk aversion (CRRA).
9be defined below. 4) The parameter σ > 0, is a non-negative constant.
2.2.1.2 Imperfect Substitutability in Consumption
Our representative agent has a consumption set, which includes both the trade-
ables from Home and the tradeables from Foreign. Following Wickens (2008)7, we
allow imperfect substitutability among the tradeables from the Home and Foreign
economies, and we assume that the aggregation for the tradeables Ci,t takes a
Cobb-Douglas form,8 which is a technological relation between total consumption
in Home-produced goods and Foreign-produced goods.
Ci,t =
(CHi,t)
κ(CFi,t)
1−κ
κκ(1− κ)1−κ (2.2)
where: 1) Ci,t is the level of total consumption in each state economy. 2) C
H
i,t and
CFi,t are levels of consumption in the tradeables produced at Home and Foreign,
respectively.
The consumption expenditures in nominal terms are:
Pi,tCi,t = P
H
i,tC
H
i,t + P
F
i,tC
F
i,t (2.3)
7See Wickens (2008): Section 7.5.2.
8A Cobb-Douglas function is a special form of the CES (constant elasticity of substitution)
function. A CES function can be written as: Y = A
[
αKγ + (1− α)Lγ] 1γ , in which the limiting
case γ = 0 corresponds to a Cobb-Douglas function Y = AKαL1−α, with constant returns to
scale.
In the literature, the consumption index C can also be assumed to take a more general CES
functional form, as an aggregate of Home and Foreign goods. C =
[
ν
1
θC
θ−1
θ
H +(1−ν)
1
θC
θ−1
θ
F
] θ
θ−1 ,
where θ > 0 is the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution between Home and Foreign-produced
goods CH and CF . See Sutherland (2005) for an example. The parameter ν determines Home
consumers’ preferences for Home-produced goods, and the parameter (1− ν) determines Home
consumers’ preferences for Foreign-produced goods. The size of the parameter ν could be
determined by the relative size of the Home economy (n) and of the Foreign economy (1 − n),
and also of the degree of openness λ. More specifically, (1−ν) = (1−n)λ. Similarly, the Foreign
economy has a consumption index as: C∗ =
[
ν∗
1
θC∗H
θ−1
θ + (1− ν∗) 1θC∗F
θ−1
θ
] θ
θ−1 , with ν∗ = nλ.
That is, Foreign consumers’ preferences for Home-produced goods depend on the relative size of
the Home economy and the degree of openness. The specification of ν and ν∗ generates “home
bias” in consumption. This bias only disappears when λ = 1.
In our model, we assume inter-temporal elasticity of substitution and imperfect substitutability
among the Home and Foreign goods.
10
where: 1) Pi,t are the general price levels in each state economy. 2) P
H
i,t and P
F
i,t
are the nominal price levels of the tradeables produced at Home and Foreign,
respectively.
2.2.1.3 Household Budget Constraint
The household flow budget constraint in nominal terms is:
Pi,tCi,t +Mi,t +Bi,t + Ti,t = Wi,tLi,t +Di,t +Mi,t−1 + (1 +Rt)Bi,t−1
where: The left-hand side represents the total money outflows from the household,
and the right-hand side represents the total money inflows to the household. 1)
Wi,tLi,t is the nominal wage income from labor supply. 2) Di,t is the dividend
payment from firms. 3) Mi,t is the nominal money holding of the household. 4)
Bi,t is the nominal domestic bond holding of the household. 5) Ti,t is the lump-sum
tax.
2.2.2 Firms
Having specified the demand side from the household’s perspective in the previous
part, let us now turn to the supply side of production by the firms in this two-state
model economy.
2.2.2.1 Production Function
We assume that each economy produces one type of good, and they trade with each
other because their consumers prefer to consume a variety of consumption goods,
which is determined by their consumption preference of imperfect substitutability
as stated in equation (2.2). In each economy, firms hire labor Li,t as their input
during the process of output production. Their production function is assumed to
take an “AL” form:
Yi,t = AiF(Li,t) = Ai(Li,t) (2.4)
This supply of goods is consumed by domestic residents, foreign residents, and
domestic government.
Yi,t = C
H
i,t + C
F
j,t +Gi,t (2.5)
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2.2.2.2 Firms’ Budget Constraint
The firms’ budget constraint in nominal terms is:
Pi,tYi,t = Wi,tLi,t +Di,t (2.6)
where: 1) Wi,t is the nominal wage rate. 2) Di,t is the dividend.
2.2.2.3 Price Determination
The price level is determined via the firms’ wage-setting process, in which the real
wage rate
Wi,t
Pi,t
is equivalent to the marginal productivity of labor
∂Yi,t
∂Li,t
= Ai in
firms’ production process.
Pi,t =
Wi,t
Ai
(2.7)
2.2.3 Fiscal Authority
Each economy has its independent fiscal authority and sets its own fiscal policy
at the individual country level. The fiscal authorities also purchase goods from
domestic producers as part of public expenditure. In order to finance this govern-
ment spending, the fiscal authority levies a lump-sum tax on domestic residents.
But if there is not enough revenue to back their spending, the fiscal authority also
issues government bonds to domestic residents and foreign residents so as to have
a balanced government budget.
Under a monetary union, the absence of national currencies means that fiscal pol-
icy is the main policy instrument available to manage domestic macroeconomic
cycles, and as a consequence of that, the importance of fiscal stability is even
greater for members of a currency union.
2.2.3.1 Government Budget Constraint
The government’s budget constraint in nominal terms is:
PHi,tGi,t +Mi,t−1 + (1 +Rt)B
G
i,t−1 = Ti,t +Mi,t +B
G
i,t (2.8)
where: The left hand side is money outflows from the government, whilst the right
hand side is money inflows into the government. 1) Gi,t is the level of government
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spending. 2) (1 +Rt)B
G
i,t−1 is the re-payment of government bond borrowing from
the previous period, plus the interest to the private sector. 3) Bi,t is the revenue
from the issuance of government bond in the current period. 4) Ti,t is the size of
tax revenue.
Money M is included in each government’s budget constraint. This implies that
any seigniorage revenue will go to each state’s fiscal authority, but not to the
central monetary authority.
2.2.3.2 Inter-State Bond Market
In the nominal household budget constraint, Bi,t is the total bond holding by the
household, the composition of which includes holdings of both domestic govern-
ment issued bonds and foreign government issued bonds.
Bi,t = B
G
i,t + Ft (2.9)
Bj,t = B
G
j,t − Ft (2.10)
where: 1) Bi,t is the total bond holding by the household. 2) B
G
i,t is the household’s
holding of domestic government issued bonds. 3) Ft is the household’s net holding
position of foreign government issued bonds. For the two economies in a currency
union, their net holding of the other government’s issued bonds is of the same size,
but with different signs.
2.2.4 Monetary Authority
An independent monetary authority has (at least) three conventional monetary
policy instruments: the (nominal) exchange rate, the (nominal) interest rate, and
the (nominal) money supply. In a monetary union, there is a central monetary
authority which conducts monetary policy for its member economies. Under this
same monetary policy regime, our two member economies have the same fixed
nominal exchange rate, and a common nominal interest rate.
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2.2.4.1 Interest Rate
The monetary authority has its monetary policy instrument: the nominal interest
rate Rt.
9 We assume that the monetary authority adopts a Taylor (1993) style
monetary rule and sets the nominal interest rate as follows:10
Rt = pit + r + τ(pit − pi) (2.11)
where variables without a time subscript are their respective values at the steady
state. That is, pi is the steady-state value of the average inflation rate in the
currency union; and r is the steady-state value of the real interest rate for the
currency union. The parameter τ is a measure of how aggressive the monetary
authority reacts to the deviation of the actual inflation ratio relative to the tar-
get inflation ratio. The intuition behind this monetary rule is that the nominal
interest rate should be set in response to the deviation of the actual inflation rate
from the target inflation rate.
The inflation rate is calculated from the weighted-average price level Pt between
Home and Foreign.
1 + pit =
Pt
Pt−1
(2.12)
The weighted-average price level Pt between Home and Foreign depends on the
relative size of the real GDP level in each economy.
Pt = P
µ
1,tP
1−µ
2,t (2.13)
where µ is the weight, which is a proxy for the relative size of the Home economy
in the currency union.
Alternatively, we can also calculate the average inflation rate for the currency
9The 2008 financial crisis has taught us that conventional monetary policy (which is conducted
through setting the nominal interest rate or the nominal money supply) may not always be
adequate, due to the fact that it is being constrained by a zero lower bound for the nominal
interest rate. It is the unboundedness that complicates life; but in economics, the boundedness
also complicates the work of economists.
10In the literature, an alternative approach is to use a Calvo-style inflation-forecast-based
(IFB) interest rate rule, which depends on a discounted sum of current and future rates of
inflation. See, for example, Levine, McAdam, and Pearlman (2007).
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union, by taking the weighted-average of the inflation rates in each economy.
pit = µpi1,t + (1− µ)pi2,t (2.14)
2.2.4.2 Money Supply
In order to facilitate monetary transactions in purchasing the consumption goods,
we introduce the “cash-in-advance” (CIA) condition, originally due to Clower
(1967), which exclusively focuses on the transaction demand for money, and as-
sumes that all goods and services should be paid in full with cash at the time of
purchase. Early examples include the work by Lucas (1982) and Svensson (1985),
in which the demand for money is generated by postulating a “cash-in-advance”
constraint.
As described by Clower (1967), goods buy money, and money buy goods, but
goods do not buy goods, and because goods do not buy goods, a medium of ex-
change that serves to aid the process of transaction has its value. As a medium of
exchange, money facilitates transactions and yields utility indirectly by allowing
certain purchases to be made or by reducing the costs that are associated with
transactions. The nature of the transaction technology in the economy then de-
termines the demand for money.
With the “cash-in-advance” (CIA) condition, we impose a rigid restriction on the
nature of transactions, and require that money balances be held to finance certain
type of purchases, otherwise these purchases can not be made without money. So
these CIA models capture the role of money as a medium of exchange by requiring
explicitly that money (should) be used to purchase consumption goods.
To model the CIA condition, household money balance M is a pre-determined
variable. That is, it is not exogenous, as it is endogenously determined by the
CIA constraint.
This CIA specification can be represented by assuming that our representative
agent faces a standard budget constraint, and a CIA constraint. This CIA con-
straint must be considered in solving the optimization problem of the household.
The first-order conditions then imply a money demand equation.
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In CIA models, the assumption on the timing is important. Following the timing
convention as in Svensson (1985), Cooley and Hansen (1989, 1991), we assume
that the goods market opens before the asset market.11 Our representative agent
enters the period with money holdings Mt−1 and receives a lump-sum transfer
Tt (in nominal terms). The goods market is assumed to open first, so our CIA
constraint takes the form:
Pi,tCi,t ≤Mi,t−1
where: 1) Ci,t is the real consumption. 2) Pi,t is the aggregate price level.
Expressed in real terms, the CIA constraint becomes:
Ci,t ≤ Mi,t−1
Pi,t
=
1
1 + pii,t
Mi,t−1
Pi,t−1
where: 1+pii,t =
Pi,t
Pi,t−1
is 1 plus the inflation rate.
The timing of this CIA constraint is as follows: In time period t− 1, the represen-
tative agent chooses the nominal money balance Mi,t−1, and carry this amount of
money into time period t. The real value of these nominal money balance Mi,t−1 is
determined by the aggregate price level Pi,t in time period t. By this specification,
we assume that income from production during time period t will not become
available for consumption purchases during period t.
In the case of the Euro Zone, it is the individual central bank that supplies money
supply Mi,t to their own economy, in response to their national demand which
is endogenously determined by consumption Mi,t = Pi,tCi,t. That is why each
government’s budget constraint includes its own money supply Mi,t.
11By contrast, Lucas (1982) has the timing assumption that the asset market opens before the
goods market. Under this timing assumption, the CIA constraint would then take the form:
Ci,t ≤ 11 + pii,t
Mi,t−1
Pi,t−1
− bi,t
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2.2.5 Inter-State Trade
Another linkage between these two economies is that they are allowed to trade with
one another, in exchange for their consumption goods produced at each economy.
2.2.5.1 Terms of Trade
An economy’s terms of trade is measured as the price of its exports relative to
the price of its imports after adjusting for the exchange rate. But the nominal
exchange rate is fixed at one in a currency union, so the terms of trade is just the
price ratio between exports and imports for an economy.
P ToTi,t =
PHi,t
P Fi,t
(2.15)
where: 1) PHi,t is the price of Home exports to Foreign. 2) P
F
i,t is the price of Home
imports from Foreign.
An increase in Home’s terms of trade ratio means that Home exports to Foreign be-
come relatively more expensive than Home imports from Foreign, and hence Home
exports become less competitive, and this is a deterioration in Home’s terms of
trade.
2.2.5.2 Balance of Payments
The nominal balance of payments condition consists of current account and capital
account here, as households are allowed to hold both domestic debt and foreign-
issued debt, and therefore there is international (financial) capital movement.
BoPi : P
H
i,tC
F
j,t − P Fi,tCFi,t +RtFt−1 = ∆Ft (2.16)
BoPj : P
H
j,tC
F
i,t − P Fj,tCFj,t −RtFt−1 = −∆Ft (2.17)
where: 1) CFj,t are Home exports to Foreign. 2) P
H
i,tC
F
j,t is the value of Home ex-
ports to Foreign, denominated in the common currency. 3) CFi,t are Home imports
from Foreign. 4) P Fi,tC
F
i,t is the value of Home imports from Foreign, denominated
in the common currency. 5) PHi,tC
F
j,t − P Fi,tCFi,t is also the balance of trade. 6) Ft is
Home’s net position of Foreign bond holdings. 7) Home’s net position of Foreign
bond holding is the opposite of Foreign, in the sense that they are of the same size
but with different signs.
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The two balance of payments conditions can also be written as:
BoPi : P
H
i,tC
F
j,t + (1 +Rt)Ft−1 = P
F
i,tC
F
i,t + Ft (2.18)
BoPj : P
H
j,tC
F
i,t − (1 +Rt)Ft−1 = P Fj,tCFj,t − Ft (2.19)
where: 1) The left-hand side is the value of exports this period, plus interest pay-
ments received this period from Home’s net position of Foreign bond holding in the
previous period. The sum of the left-hand side represents the total money inflows
to the Home economy. 2) The right-hand side is the value of imports this period,
plus payments for Home’s net position of Foreign bond holding this period. The
sum of the right-hand side represents the total money outflows from the Home
economy.
The above approach is due to household’s intra-temporal decisions, where the allo-
cation of demand depends on the relative price of domestic and foreign-produced
goods. 12
In our model world, we only have a currency union, and we only have Home
and Foreign in this currency union. For the currency union as a whole, the bal-
ance of payments condition has to hold. But within the currency union, each
economy can have a current account surplus or a current account deficit. 13
12An alternative approach is that the current account can also be explained by the inter-
temporal decisions, which is represented by the Saving-Investment identity.
Y = C + SP + T
Y = C + I +G+NX
C + SP + T = C + I +G+NX
SP − I + (T −G) = NX
(SP + SG)− I = NX
13In the real world, there are other countries outside this currency union. We can model our
system to include a currency union, and the rest of the world. For this model system as a whole,
the balance of payments condition has to hold. But within this model system, the currency union
could run a current account surplus or a current account deficit, whilst the rest of the world
would run a current account deficit or a current account surplus, which is of the same size but
with a different sign as that of the currency union.
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2.2.6 Macro Dynamics
For each economy in our currency union, the economy-wide resource constraint
is derived from the household budget constraint, government budget constraint,
balance of payments, and the national account identity.14
The economy-wide resource constraint (in nominal terms) can be written as:
Pi,tYi,t = P
H
i,tC
H
i,t + P
F
i,tC
F
i,t + Ti,t +B
G
i,t − (1 +Rt)BGi,t−1
+Fi,t − (1 +Rt)Fi,t−1 +Mi,t −Mi,t−1
We deflate this nominal equation by the general price level to obtain the economy-
wide resource constraint, in real terms:
Yi,t =
PHi,t
Pi,t
CHi,t +
P Fi,t
Pi,t
CFi,t +
Ti,t
Pi,t
+
BGi,t
Pi,t
− (1 +Rt)
BGi,t−1
Pi,t−1
Pi,t−1
Pi,t
+
Fi,t
Pi,t
− (1 +Rt)Fi,t−1
Pi,t−1
Pi,t−1
Pi,t
+
Mi,t
Pi,t
− Mi,t−1
Pi,t−1
Pi,t−1
Pi,t
Yi,t =
PHi,t
Pi,t
CHi,t +
P Fi,t
Pi,t
CFi,t + ti,t + b
G
i,t − (1 +Rt)
bGi,t−1
1 + pii,t
+ fi,t − (1 +Rt) fi,t−1
1 + pii,t
+mi,t − mi,t−1
1 + pii,t
where: 1) bGi,t is the holding of domestic government bonds in real terms. 2) mi,t
is the real money balance.
Dynamic Optimization:
A representative agent’s optimization problem is to maximize his utility:
U(Ci,t) = Et
[ ∞∑
t=1
βt
(Ci,t)
1−σ − 1
1− σ
]
subject to the economy-wide resource constraint, and the CIA constraint15:
Ci,t ≤ mi,t−1
1 + pii,t
14See Appendix A1 for the consistency check of these 5 accounting identities.
15If money is held, the CIA constraint must be binding in some states of nature. The nominal
interest rate will equal the discounted expected value of money.
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Set up his Lagrangian problem (with s > 0):
L =
∞∑
s=0
{
βsU(Ci,t+s) + λi,t+s
[
Yi,t+s −
PHi,t+s
Pi,t+s
CHi,t+s −
P Fi,t+s
Pi,t+s
CFi,t+s − ti,t+s
−bGi,t+s + (1 +Rt+s)
bGi,t+s−1
1 + pii,t+s
− fi,t+s + (1 +Rt+s) fi,t+s−1
1 + pii,t+s
−mi,t+s + mi,t+s−1
1 + pii,t+s
]
+λ2i,t+s
( mi,t+s−1
1 + pii,t+s
− Ci,t+s
)}
where: 1) The choice variables are: CHi,t+s, C
F
i,t+s, b
G
i,t+s, fi,t+s, mi,t+s. b
G
i,t+s, fi,t+s,
and mi,t+s are pre-determined variables. The time (t− 1) values of the predeter-
mined variables are given at time t. 2) The parameter β is the discount factor.
β = 1
1+ρ
. The parameter ρ is the time preference by our representative agent.
The first-order conditions with respect to the choice variables are:
∂L
∂CHi,t+s
= (βsC−σi,t+s)
(
κ
Ci,t+s
CHi,t+s
)
− λi,t+s
PHi,t+s
Pi,t+s
− λ2i,t+sκCi,t+s
CHi,t+s
= 0
∂L
∂CFi,t+s
= (βsC−σi,t+s)
[
(1− κ)Ci,t+s
CFi,t+s
]
− λi,t+s
P Fi,t+s
Pi,t+s
− λ2i,t+s(1− κ)Ci,t+s
CFi,t+s
= 0
∂L
∂bGi,t+s
= λi,t+s(1 + pii,t+s+1)− λi,t+s+1(1 +Rt+s+1) = 0
∂L
∂fi,t+s
= λi,t+s(1 + pii,t+s+1)− λi,t+s+1(1 +Rt+s+1) = 0
∂L
∂mi,t+s
= λi,t+s(1 + pii,t+s+1)− λi,t+s+1 − λ2i,t+s+1 = 0
The Euler equation16 is:
β
(Ci,t+s+1
Ci,t+s
)−σ 1 +Rt+s
1 + pii,t+s+1
= 1 (2.20)
In the long run, the Euler equation solves for the price level. This is because at
the steady state, consumption disappears, the nominal interest rate is determined
by the Taylor rule, the inflation is defined in terms of the price level, and the
difference in the real interest rates is set equal to the risk premium.
16See Appendix A2 for the derivation of this Euler equation.
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The model equations are:
Ci,t =
(CHi,t)
κ(CFi,t)
1−κ
κκ(1− κ)1−κ
Pi,tCi,t = P
H
i,tC
H
i,t + P
F
i,tC
F
i,t
Pi,tCi,t +Mi,t +Bi,t + Ti,t = Pi,tYi,t +Mi,t−1 + (1 +Rt)Bi,t−1
Yi,t = Ai × Li,t
Yi,t = C
H
i,t + C
F
j,t +Gi,t
Pi,tYi,t = P
H
i,tC
H
i,t + P
H
i,tGi,t + P
H
i,tC
F
j,t
PHi,tGi,t +Mi,t−1 + (1 +Rt)B
G
i,t−1 = Ti,t +Mi,t +B
G
i,t
Bi,t = B
G
i,t + Ft
Bj,t = B
G
j,t − Ft
PHi,tC
F
j,t + (1 +Rt)Ft−1 = P
F
i,tC
F
i,t + Ft
PHj,tC
F
i,t − (1 +Rt)Ft−1 = P Fj,tCFj,t − Ft
β
(Ci,t+1
Ci,t
)−σ 1 +Rt
1 + pii,t+1
= 1
Mi,t−1 = Pi,tCi,t
Mt =
2∑
i=1
Mi,t = M1,t +M2,t
Pt = P
µ
1,tP
1−µ
2,t
1 + pit =
Pt
Pt−1
Rt = pi + r + (1 + τ)(pit − pi)
2.2.7 Programing & Calibration
We program our log-linearized model into Dynare17 implemented in Matlab. The
number of endogenous variables should equal to the number of log-linearized equa-
tions, in order for the model system to be viable. As a first step, we calibrate the
model to be symmetric between the two state economies as our benchmark, so
that we can check the stability of our model. Building from that, we calibrate the
model to make the two state economies distinct from each other, for the purpose
of conducting our economic experiments and investigating our research questions.
In both the symmetric and asymmetric setup, we find that the two economies have
17See Adjemain et al. (2011) and other useful documentation available on their website
www.dynare.org
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a steady state.
The table below lists our calibration of the structural parameters that we use
with the same values across all the experiments and extensions in this chapter.
We calibrate our representative agent’s rate of time preference, and the size of
the discount factor, in consistency with quarterly data empirically. So when we
do simulation in Dynare, each time period of simulation represents a quarter, and
the interpretation of impulse-response functions follow accordingly.
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998) run regressions of the US federal funds rates
on inflation and output, and find that inflation coefficients are below one prior to
1980 and above one since then.18 So we calibrate our inflation coefficient (1 + τ)
to be > 1.
Table 2.1. Baseline DSGE Model - Structural Parameter Calibration
Parameter Value Definition
κ 0.5 substitutability between consumption goods
µ 0.7 weight in calculating average price level
ρ 0.05 representative agent’s rate of time preference
σ 4 a non-negative constant in the power utility function
τ 1.5 monetary authority’s aggressiveness in the Taylor rule
2.2.8 Extension: Two-Currency Regime
In the main part of this chapter, we consider the case of a currency union for the
two economies. As an extension (and as a comparison), we also allow each econ-
omy to have their own monetary authority in order to conduct their independent
monetary policy. In the next section, these two cases (single currency regime and
two-currency regime) will both be examined in our economic experiments.
Under a two-currency monetary regime, the independence in monetary policy in-
cludes a flexible exchange rate between the two economies, and a separate nominal
interest rate for each economy. Money supply still satisfies the “cash-in-advance”
18See Cochrane (2011) for some theoretical discussion of the determinacy and identification
with the Taylor rule.
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condition in each economy.
In the CAPM (capital asset pricing model)19, when there are two risky assets,
we take into account the variance-covariance structure of returns to decide the
proportions of each asset to hold in our portfolio. But in DSGE models, second
moments are typically ignored, which means that the CAPM results can not be
applied here.
Hence in our DSGE model, we use the existing balance of payments (BoP) con-
dition, plus a no-arbitrage condition to link the two returns. This no-arbitrage
condition is in essence an interest arbitrage equation, in which the returns are the
same after risk adjustment.
Economic Modeling: Independent Monetary Policy
In this model extension, the main change is due to the fact that we have an inde-
pendent monetary authority in each economy, so we discuss in detail its possible
monetary policy instruments and responsibility as follows.
Monetary Authority:
(a) Nominal Exchange Rate
Without a common currency, each monetary authority also have the monetary
policy instrument: the nominal exchange rate. In a currency union, the nominal
exchange rate is exogenous, to be exact, it is given and fixed at one. Now we
examine the case where the nominal exchange rate is allowed to float freely, and
therefore the nominal exchange rate is endogenous in our new case without a cur-
rency union.
The nominal exchange rate measures the relative price of a currency with respect
to another currency, that is, the rate at which one currency will be exchanged for
another.
St =
F$
H$
(2.21)
Take Home and Foreign for an example. The nominal exchange rate between
Home and Foreign measures the corresponding units of Home currency for one
19In finance, the CAPM is used to determine a theoretically appropriate required rate of return
of an asset, if we want to add that asset into an already well-diversified portfolio.
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unit of Foreign currency. For each unit of Home currency, if there is an increase
in the equivalent amount of Foreign currency, then this means that the Home
currency becomes more valuable in the sense that it can exchange for more For-
eign currency, and hence there is an appreciation in the Home currency and a
depreciation in the Foreign currency. That is, a St increase is associated with an
appreciation in the Home currency.
Terms of Trade:
As defined in Section 2.2.4, an economy’s terms of trade is measured in terms
of the price of its exports relative to the price of its imports after adjusting for
the nominal exchange rate. Unlike the case with a currency union, the nominal
exchange rate is not fixed at one now, and hence the terms of trade becomes:
P ToTi,t = St
P Fj,t
P Fi,t
(2.22)
Real Exchange Rate:
In our model, each economy only produces a single good. So the terms of trade is
equivalent to the real exchange rate.
Qt = St
P Fj,t
P Fi,t
(2.23)
Law of One Price:
In comparison, there is also the notion of Law of One Price (LOOP). LOOP is an
economic law, which can be stated as: In an efficient market, all identical goods
must have only one price. That is to say, for the same good, it should be pur-
chased at the same price after adjusting for exchange rate, transportation cost,
etc. LOOP applies to the price of a single good.
Purchasing Power Parity:
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is a measure of how much money would be needed
to purchase the same amount of goods and services in two different countries. At
the PPP rate, that size of money has the same purchasing power across the two
countries. PPP applies to the general price level of all goods. But in our model,
each economy only produces one good. So LOOP is equivalent to PPP here. If
PPP is held exactly, then the real exchange rate would always equal one, Qt = 1.
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(b) Interest Rate:
With independent monetary policy, the monetary authority in each economy de-
termines its own nominal interest rate Ri,t, and has the Taylor (1993) style interest
rate rule as:
Ri,t = pii + ri + (1 + τ)(pii,t − pii) (2.24)
Uncovered Interest Parity:
We assume that the “uncovered interest parity” (UIP) condition holds, in order to
avoid international arbitrage opportunities in the bond market. This UIP condi-
tion involves expectation formation of the future exchange rate, and can be written
as:
Ri,t = Rj,t + Et∆st+1 (2.25)
where: 1) Ri,t = the nominal interest rate at Home. 2) Rj,t = the nominal interest
rate at Foreign. 3) st = the logarithm of the nominal exchange rate between Home
and Foreign.
We also assume that Home and Foreign bonds are perfect substitutes to each
other, and as such, Home and Foreign have no incentive to hold the other’s bonds.
Therefore, the UIP condition is also the balance of payments condition.
Solve this UIP equation forward, we get:
st =
∞∑
t=0
Et(Rj,t+s −Ri,t+s) (2.26)
The intuition behind this equation is that the nominal exchange rate will respond
to any new information on the current and expected future nominal interest rate
differentials.
(c) Money Supply:
On the money supply side, we still assume the “cash-in-advance” (CIA) condi-
tion, where money holdings are equal to the total expenditure on the purchase of
consumption goods in each economy. Money market is assumed to clear in each
economy. In a non-currency union case, each monetary authority is only respon-
sible for money supply in its own economy.
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New Model System
On the consumer side, the introduction of a flexible exchange rate changes the
equation of their consumption expenditure:
P1,tC1,t = P
H
1,tC
H
1,t +
1
St
P F1,tC
F
1,t (2.27)
P2,tC2,t = P
H
2,tC
H
2,t + StP
F
2,tC
F
2,t (2.28)
The new model equations are:
Ci,t =
(CHi,t)
κ(CFi,t)
1−κ
κκ(1− κ)1−κ
P1,tC1,t = P
H
1,tC
H
1,t +
1
St
P F1,tC
F
1,t
P2,tC2,t = P
H
2,tC
H
2,t + StP
F
2,tC
F
2,t
Pi,tCi,t +Mi,t +Bi,t + Ti,t = Pi,tYi,t +Mi,t−1 + (1−Ri,t−1)Bi,t−1
Yi,t = Ai,t × Li,t
Yi,t = C
H
i,t + C
F
j,t +Gi,t
Pi,tYi,t = P
H
i,tC
H
i,t + P
H
i,tGi,t + P
H
i,tC
F
j,t
PHi,tGi,t +Mi,t−1 + (1 +Ri,t−1)B
G
i,t−1 = Ti,t +Mi,t +B
G
i,t
Bi,t = Ft +B
G
i,t
Bj,t = −Ft +BGj,t
β
(Ci,t+1
Ci,t
)−σ 1 +Rt
1 + pii,t+1
= 1
Mi,t−1 = Pi,tCi,t
Qt = St
P Fj,t
P Fi,t
= 1
Ri,t = pii + ri + (1 + τ)(pii,t − pii)
Ri,t = Rj,t + Et∆st+1
2.3 Economic Experiments
In our analytical framework, there is a currency union between the two economies.
On the fiscal side, each economy has its own independent fiscal authority. On the
monetary side, there is only one central monetary authority, and the two economies
are operated under the same monetary policy regime. Conventionally, there are
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three possible monetary policy instruments by a monetary authority: the nominal
exchange rate, the nominal money supply, and the nominal interest rate. In our
currency union, our two economies have a fixed exchange rate, so the nominal
exchange rate is fixed at one in our model economy. The money supply passively
satisfies the “cash-in-advance” (CIA) constraint in our model. Therefore, the only
effective monetary policy instrument in our currency union is the nominal inter-
est rate by the central monetary authority. It is the difference in inflation rates
that matters for the conduct of joint monetary policy in a currency union with a
common nominal interest rate.
The practical point of our exercise is to examine the (policy) implications of the
European Central Bank (ECB) setting interest rates based on the average infla-
tion in the Euro Zone. As the first part of our economic experiment, we simulate
a productivity shock/gain to our Home/big economy, as productivity is the key to
economic growth over the long run. This economic experiment is a positive sup-
ply shock. In our second economic experiment, we consider the implementation
of fiscal austerity in the Home economy. This experiment is a negative demand
shock. For both of these two economic experiments, we first discuss the case of
a single currency monetary policy regime, and then the case of a two-currency
policy regime for the same shock.
(Another possible economic experiment with this DSGE model is a migration
shock to any of the economies. According to Robert Mundell (who is the father
of the Euro), an important factor to make the shared common currency work is
a mobile labor force. The intuition behind this key factor is that economies in a
currency union lose their “degree of freedom” by giving up the right to adjust their
(nominal) interest rates or re/devalue their currency when faced with (external or
internal) economic shocks. But in Europe, only a small percentage of Europeans
migrate across borders every year. By contrast, there are many more Americans
who have inter-state migration each year. So migration shock would not be crucial
for the Euro Zone.)
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2.3.1 Productivity Shock
2.3.1.1 Single Currency Regime
First, we study the case of a single-currency monetary policy regime, for our Home
economy and Foreign economy. As part of our economic experiment, we introduce
a productivity shock into the Home production sector. This can be, for example,
due to a technology advancement in the Home economy. A productivity shock is
a shock from the supply side. For production, the output function in the Home
economy is represented by: Y1,t = A1L1,t, where A1 is the total factor productiv-
ity (TFP) in the production of Home output. It can also be thought of as some
labor-augmenting technology, which makes labor more productive and hence there
will be an increase in productivity and production. In our Matlab code, the in-
crease in Home’s productivity is proxied by a rise of e1 to their TFP parameter
A1. In Figure 2.1, we present the impulse response functions of some endogenous
variables of our interest (the price levels and interest rates) from our stochastic
simulation in Dynare, for this productivity shock in the Home economy under a
single currency policy regime.
For the productivity shock in the Home economy, the improvement in Home’s
productivity level A1 will lead to an initial increase in Home’s production level Y1.
Part of this Home production increase will be absorbed by domestic consumers.
We assume20 that the goods market is in equilibrium initially. There are two ef-
fects on the level/change of prices at play here. On the one hand, there is the
supply-side effect, in the sense that an increase in productivity will increase po-
tential output, which in turn will put downward pressure on the price level. In
other words, the increase on the supply side will lead to a surplus and will cause
a fall in the Home price of Home-produced goods PH1 , which will contribute to
a decrease in the general price level P1 at Home.
21 On the other hand22, there
is also the demand-side effect, which is like the wealth effect, in the sense that
our representative agent’s income stream will increase and they will become/feel
wealthier, which will encourage them to increase their consumption C1, putting
upward pressure on the price level and potentially leading to inflation. These
20Economists make assumptions all the time.
21The reasoning for the decrease in the Home’s price level P1 can also be shown via the
relation of price determination: P1,t =
W1,t
A1
. Take the partial derivative of P1,t with respect to
A1:
∂P1,t
∂A1
= −W1,t
A21
< 0.
22Economists have two hands!
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two effects from the supply side and the demand side counteract each other. In
our DSGE modeling, we focus more on the short run or the medium run, with
each time period representing a quarter. So the supply-side effect dominates the
demand-side effect in our case. Then an increase in the factor productivity A1 will
cause an initial decrease in the price level P1 before climbing back to its steady-
state level, as shown in our simulation results. This initial decrease in the general
price level would put deflationary pressure to the Home economy.
Given the larger share of the Home economy in the currency union, the central
monetary authority will take this deflationary pressure from the Home economy
into consideration when making the joint monetary policy for the currency union.
A fall in the inflation level will leave room for the central monetary authority to
ease its monetary policy. This is done by cutting the nominal interest rate for
the currency union as a whole. The decrease in the nominal interest rate, along
with the change in the inflation rate, will lead the real interest rates to behave
differently for the two economies. Our impulse response functions show that the
Home economy will still have a positive real interest rate first, as the initial change
in the nominal interest rate is probably smaller than the change in Home’s price
level. This initial hike will be followed by a fall for Home’s real interest rate, whilst
Foreign’s real interest rate will drop first before a rise. This is due to the relative
magnitude of the change in the nominal interest rate and inflation rates, and the
pace at which they are channeled through in each economy.
2.3.1.2 Two-Currency Regime
Next, we conduct the same economic experiment of a productivity shock in the
Home economy, for the case of a two-currency monetary policy regime. The im-
pulse response functions (for the price levels and interest rates) are presented in
Figure 2.2. With a productivity shock from the supply side in the Home economy,
there will be an expansion in the output of Home-produced goods. Assuming that
nothing has changed on the supply side in the Foreign economy, the increase in
Home production indicates that there will be a relative abundance of Home-made
goods in the market. The relative surplus of Home production will initially put
downward pressure on Home’s price level. This will leave room for Home’s central
bank to ease its monetary policy stance, by cutting its nominal interest rate R1.
The corresponding nominal interest rates for Home and Foreign are linked via
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the UIP condition, which in turn is reflected in the relative movement in their
bi-lateral nominal exchange rate. This is the so-called “external revaluation”, as
compared to the “internal revaluation” in the case of a single currency regime.
Our impulse response function shows that the magnitude of the drop in infla-
tion rate is smaller than the drop in nominal interest rate for both Home and
Foreign, and therefore their real interest rates will also decrease, which in turn
will reduce the borrowing cost for the private sector in order to finance the ex-
pansion in Home production. In general, the decrease in the real interest rate
will encourage borrowing and spending, which will boost consumer and business
confidence.
Comparing our simulation results from both the single currency and two-currency
regimes, we find that in the case of a single currency, the pace and timing of the
change in the inflation rates and the real interest rates occur differently, which is
because of the counter-balancing forces from the sources of the shocks, the rela-
tive size of the two economies, and some “compromise” or adjustment made in
between. But in the two-currency case, the real interest rates adjust quickly for
both Home and Foreign.
2.3.2 Fiscal Austerity
The famous British economist John Maynard Keynes once said that “The boom,
not the slump, is the right time for austerity”. In an economy, such as the Euro
Zone, where monetary policy is ineffective - both because of enfeebled financial
system and (close-to) zero interest rate (at which the central bank could “inter-
vene”), fiscal policy needs to be used. This is particularly true when the private
sector has a huge structural excess of income over spending, and as a result of this
lacklustre demand, economic recovery is weak, and therefore consideration should
be given to greater near-term flexibility in the fiscal adjustment path. The double
aims of fiscal policy must be to maintain aggregate demand, and at the same time,
to improve aggregate supply for the whole economy.
But in reality, Europe rejects this view of Keynes and insists on implementing
fiscal austerity during the economic slump after the sovereign debt crisis in the
Euro area, which was triggered by the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) after the
collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. The economic rationale behind
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Euro Zone’s fiscal austerity policy is that following the introduction of the Euro in
1999, many Euro Zone countries, among them the PIIGS countries (Portugal, Ire-
land, Italy, Greece, and Spain), experienced a dramatic decline in their borrowing
costs for both of their public and private sectors. As a consequence of that, cheap
credit, which was often fed by capital from banks in the “core” economies of the
Euro Zone, fueled a credit boom that led to high growth rates in those “periphery”
economies of the Euro Zone. This in turn attracted more capital and investment
to those economies. But at the same time, it also increased the indebtedness of
households and firms. Current account balances had a sharp deterioration , and
countries accumulated large foreign debt. Governments expanded their balance
sheet, due to their mis-perception that the high growth rates would lead to per-
manent increase in their income.
So in our second economic experiment, we introduce fiscal austerity into our
Home economy. In this case, the Home government conducts a contractionary
fiscal policy, which is achieved by decreasing its government expenditure level.
The contraction on government expenditure is a shock from the demand side.
In our Matlab code, Home’s contractionary expenditure policy is proxied by a
decrease of size e2 to their government spending variable g1.
2.3.2.1 Single Currency Regime
In a single currency monetary policy regime, Home’s expenditure shock is a con-
tractionary shock on the demand side. Real GDP will fall due to the decreased
demand for goods and services by the Home government, which in turn will con-
tribute to a decline in the aggregate demand for the whole economy. In the short
run, there is an excess capacity in production, and as a result of that, a con-
tractionary shock from the demand side will push down costs and the general
price level in the Home economy, putting deflationary pressure on the currency
union. Faced with this deflationary pressure, the central bank will cut the nom-
inal interest rate for the currency union, which will encourage the private sector
to invest/innovate more so as to compensate for the lack of demand due to the
government budget cut by the Home government. From our simulation results,
we could see that Home and Foreign’s real interest rates adjust at a different pace.
This is again due to the pace at which the shock is channeled through in both
the Home and Foreign economies via their financial and trade linkages. The cor-
responding impulse response functions (for the price levels and interest rates) are
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presented in Figure 2.3.
2.3.2.2 Two-Currency Regime
By the same reasoning, the economic analysis is similar in a two-currency mone-
tary policy regime. Same as in the experiment of the productivity shock, the Home
and Foreign economies gain “one degree of freedom” under a two-currency policy
regime. The UIP condition links the relative movement of their (individual) nom-
inal interest rates and their (bi-lateral) nominal exchange rates. The price level,
nominal interest rates, and real interest rates will adjust more quickly to better
reflect what is going on and what is needed in the Home and Foreign economies.
In Figure 2.4, we present the corresponding impulse response functions (for the
price levels and interest rates) from this expenditure shock in the Home economy
under the two-currency policy regime.
2.4 Conclusion
2.4.1 Chapter Recap
This research project contributes to the literature on the appropriateness of a cur-
rency union. To that end, we develop a two-state open economy DSGE model,
in which the two state economies are linked by their trade in goods with each
other and bond borrowing with one another. Both economies operate under the
same monetary policy regime by a central monetary authority, which fixes the
nominal exchange rate at one, sets the common nominal interest rate for the cur-
rency union, and prints money to meet the “cash-in-advance” requirement in each
economy. On the other hand, each economy retains its own fiscal independence,
by having its own separate fiscal authority, which has the authority to levy non-
distorting lump sum tax transfers, and issue nominal risk-free debt in order to
finance a given process of public expenditure. Applying our DSGE model, we
conduct economic experiments by imposing a productivity shock, and a govern-
ment expenditure shock in the Home economy. With the possible setting of a
two-currency monetary policy regime as our comparison, we find that the two
economies would have different nominal interest rates, which are linked via the
UIP (uncovered interest parity) condition. The difference in the magnitude of the
adjustment in their interest rates better reflect what (interest rate) is needed in
their economy.
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From these two economic experiments, we reach the conclusion that asymmet-
ric shocks to country inflation rates can better be dealt with by monetary policy
in a multi floating currency system. A currency union is not always appropriate
for its member economies. The problem lies with the lack of nominal exchange
rate in a currency union to reflect the relative change of economic situations in
both economies when faced with shocks. In addition to that, the “one-size-fits-
all” nominal interest rate will not be appropriate for both economies, because
the source of shocks originates from one economy which might be a supply-side
shock or a demand-side shock. On top of that, the inflation rates in individual
economies are not the same, which are mainly due to the different price dynamics
going on in each market. Consequently, the real interest rates differ in each econ-
omy, and adjust more slowly in a single-currency monetary system as compared
to a two-currency system, which in turn will further cause divergence in their
competitiveness over time.
2.4.2 Policy Implications
What is the main takeaway from this research project? As Wickens (2010) points
out, at the inception of the Euro Zone, the member countries do not satisfy an
optimal currency area, due to the fact that individual Euro Zone economies have
different inflation rates, which are unlikely to converge. The problem lies in the
very different behavior of member economies, to which a contributing factor is
the “one-size-fits-all” monetary policy that is imposed by the setting of a mon-
etary union. The common nominal interest rate is set by the central monetary
authority. However, inflation rates are unlikely to converge in individual Euro
Zone economies, and their price levels are more likely to diverge. This difference
in inflation rates will therefore cause each Euro Zone economy to have a different
real interest rate, leading to difference in competitiveness over time.23 Therefore,
we have a “two-state” economy in the Euro Zone, with difference in real interest
rates and in the degree of competitiveness among them, which is caused by the
inappropriate monetary policy under a currency union. But as a currency union,
23The real interest rate is an important measurement of an economy’s competitiveness. First,
the real interest rate measures the opportunity cost of consumption. For each dollar in your
pocket, you can either deposit it in your saving account with your bank, earning nominal interest
rate while taking into account inflation; or you can use it for consumption. Second, the real
interest rate measures the borrowing cost. The higher the real interest rate, the more expensive
it is to finance new investment projects. Third, the real interest rate also measures the interest
cost for debt. Higher real interest rate means that it costs more to pay the interest on your debt.
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the European Central Bank (ECB) has the mandate of maintaining price stabil-
ity around their inflation target for the Euro Zone as a whole. The difference in
inflation rates will therefore cause each economy to have a different real interest
rate, which in turn will lead to large difference in the degree of competitiveness
among them over time. The problem is rooted from the inappropriate monetary
policy under a currency union. Hence, the Euro Zone is not an optimal currency
area.
Inflation difference is the underlying problem for the Euro Zone project. But
which one is more important here? - [1] the difference in inflation expectations,
[2] the short-term inflation differential, or [3] the long-term inflation differential
among different Euro Zone economies?
Does [1] the difference in inflation expectations among each individual economy
matter for a currency union as a whole? Simon, Matheson, and Sandri (2013) find
that inflation expectations are strongly anchored to the central bank’s inflation
targets rather than being particularly altered by the current inflation levels; and
on top of that, the anchoring of expected inflation has increased over time, whilst
the impact of current inflation on expected inflation has diminished. Hence, there
is some “stickiness” in inflation nowadays. In the case of a monetary union, in-
flation is stabilized at the union level, however, inflation is “destabilized” at the
country level, and adjustment needs to come from each country, which is backed
by fiscal policy, in order to be viable. At the country level in a currency union,
there is no monetary authority that conducts independent monetary policy, and
hence there is no inflation target to anchor the inflation expectation.
So [1] the difference in inflation expectations among individual economies does
not matter for a currency union. Then between [2] the short-term inflation differ-
ential, and [3] the long-term inflation differential, which one is more important or
more relevant here?
By the nature of DSGE modeling in Matlab-Dynare, our model simulation shows
forecasting over the next few periods, on a quarterly basis. So by “design”, we im-
ply that it is the short-term inflation differential that matters. (To check whether
the long-term inflation differential also matters, some empirical work with real
data could be conducted as an econometric extension of this research project.)
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Appendix: Mathematics Derivation
A1. 5 accounting identities - consistency check
In Section 2.2, we have 5 accounting identities. We rewrite these 5 equations here,
in order to check their internal consistency.
(1) The household budget constraint is:
Pi,tCi,t +Mi,t +Bi,t + Ti,t = Wi,tLi,t +Di,t +Mi,t−1 + (1 +Rt)Bi,t−1
where: Bi,t = Ft +B
G
i,t
(2) The firms’ budget constraint is:
Pi,tYi,t = Wi,tLi,t +Di,t
(3) The government’s budget constraint is:
PHi,tGi,t +Mi,t−1 + (1 +Rt)B
G
i,t−1 = Ti,t +Mi,t +B
G
i,t
(4) The balance of payments is:
PHi,tC
F
j,t − P Fj,tCFi,t +RtFt−1 = ∆Ft = Ft − Ft−1
(5) The national income identity is:
Pi,tYi,t = P
H
i,tC
H
i,t + P
H
i,tGi,t + P
H
i,tC
F
j,t
Substitute the firms’ budget constraint into the household budget constraint:
Pi,tCi,t +Mi,t +Bi,t + Ti,t = Pi,tYi,t +Mi,t−1 + (1 +Rt)Bi,t−1
Rewrite the household budget constraint as:
Pi,tCi,t +Mi,t −Mi,t−1 + Ti,t +Bi,t − (1 +Rt)Bi,t−1 = Pi,tYi,t
where: Bi,t = Ft +B
G
i,t
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Rewrite the government budget constraint as:
PHi,tGi,t = Ti,t +Mi,t −Mi,t−1 +BGi,t − (1 +Rt)BGi,t−1
Substitute the rewritten government budget constraint into the household budget
constraint, we get:
Pi,tCi,t + P
H
i,tGi,t + Ft − (1 +Rt)Ft−1 = Pi,tYi,t
Write the consumption expenditure equation here:
Pi,tCi,t = P
H
i,tC
H
i,t + P
F
i,tC
F
i,t
Substitute the consumption expenditure equation into the rewritten household
budget constraint, we get:
PHi,tC
H
i,t + P
F
i,tC
F
i,t + P
H
i,tGi,t + Ft − (1 +Rt)Ft−1 = Pi,tYi,t
Write the current account balance equation here:
PHi,tC
F
j,t − P Fi,tCFi,t +RtFt−1 = Ft − Ft−1
Substitute the current account balance equation into the equation above, we get:
PHi,tC
H
i,t + P
H
i,tC
F
j,t + P
H
i,tGi,t = Pi,tYi,t
It is our national income identity in this model economy.
So we have shown that these 5 accounting identities are internally consistent.
A2. Euler equation - derivation
In Section 2.2.6, we get the Euler equation from the dynamic optimization prob-
lem. In this appendix section, we show the derivation of this Euler equation.
The first-order conditions with respect to the choice variables are:
∂L
∂CHi,t+s
= (βsC−σi,t+s)
(
κ
Ci,t+s
CHi,t+s
)
− λi,t+s
PHi,t+s
Pi,t+s
− λ2i,t+sκCi,t+s
CHi,t+s
= 0
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∂L
∂CFi,t+s
= (βsC−σi,t+s)
[
(1− κ)Ci,t+s
CFi,t+s
]
− λi,t+s
P Fi,t+s
Pi,t+s
− λ2i,t+s(1− κ)Ci,t+s
CFi,t+s
= 0
∂L
∂bGi,t+s
= λi,t+s(1 + pii,t+s+1)− λi,t+s+1(1 +Rt+s+1) = 0
∂L
∂fi,t+s
= λi,t+s(1 + pii,t+s+1)− λi,t+s+1(1 +Rt+s+1) = 0
∂L
∂mi,t+s
= λi,t+s(1 + pii,t+s+1)− λi,t+s+1 − λ2i,t+s+1 = 0
Subtract the fifth F.O.C from the third F.O.C:
−λi,t+s+1(1 +Rt+s+1) + λi,t+s+1 + λ2i,t+s+1 = 0
−λi,t+s+1 − λi,t+s+1Rt+s+1 + λi,t+s+1 + λ2i,t+s+1 = 0
−λi,t+s+1Rt+s+1 + λ2i,t+s+1 = 0
−λi,t+s+1Rt+s+1 = −λ2i,t+s+1
λi,t+s+1Rt+s+1 = λ2i,t+s+1
The first F.O.C of the optimization problem gives us:
βs(Ci,t+s)
−σ
(
κ
Ci,t+s
CHi,t+s
)
− λi,t+s
PHi,t+s
Pi,t+s
− λi,t+sRt+sκCi,t+s
CHi,t+s
= 0
βs(Ci,t+s)
−σ
(
κ
Ci,t+s
CHi,t+s
)
− λi,t+s
(PHi,t+s
Pi,t+s
+Rt+sκ
Ci,t+s
CHi,t+s
)
= 0
βs(Ci,t+s)
−σ
(
κ
Ci,t+s
CHi,t+s
)
− λi,t+s
PHi,t+sC
H
i,t+s +Rt+sκPi,t+sCi,t+s
Pi,t+sCHi,t+s
= 0
βs(Ci,t+s)
−σ
(
κ
Ci,t+s
CHi,t+s
)
= λi,t+s
PHi,t+sC
H
i,t+s +Rt+sκPi,t+sCi,t+s
Pi,t+sCHi,t+s
Move it forward by 1 period:
βs+1(Ci,t+s+1)
−σ
(
κ
Ci,t+s+1
CHi,t+s+1
)
= λi,t+s+1
PHi,t+s+1C
H
i,t+s+1 +Rt+s+1κPi,t+s+1Ci,t+s+1
Pi,t+s+1CHi,t+s+1
Take their ratio:
β
(Ci,t+s+1
Ci,t+s
)−σCi,t+s+1
Ci,t+s
CHi,t+s
CHi,t+s+1
=
λi,t+s+1
λi,t+s
Pi,t+sC
H
i,t+s
Pi,t+s+1CHi,t+s+1
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PHi,t+s+1C
H
i,t+s+1 +Rt+s+1κPi,t+s+1Ci,t+s+1
PHi,t+sC
H
i,t+s +Rt+sκPi,t+sCi,t+s
β
(Ci,t+s+1
Ci,t+s
)−σCi,t+s+1
Ci,t+s
=
λi,t+s+1
λi,t+s
Pi,t+s
Pi,t+s+1
(1 +Rt+s+1)P
H
i,t+s+1C
H
i,t+s+1
(1 +Rt+s)PHi,t+sC
H
i,t+s
β
(Ci,t+s+1
Ci,t+s
)−σ
=
λi,t+s+1
λi,t+s
1 +Rt+s+1
1 +Rt+s
PHi,t+s+1C
H
i,t+s+1
Pi,t+s+1Ci,t+s+1
Pi,t+sCi,t+s
PHi,t+sC
H
i,t+s
β
(Ci,t+s+1
Ci,t+s
)−σ
=
λi,t+s+1
λi,t+s
1 +Rt+s+1
1 +Rt+s
1
κ
κ
β
(Ci,t+s+1
Ci,t+s
)−σ
=
1 + pii,t+s+1
1 +Rt+s+1
1 +Rt+s+1
1 +Rt+s
β
(Ci,t+s+1
Ci,t+s
)−σ
=
1 + pii,t+s+1
1 +Rt+s
So we get our Euler equation:
β
(Ci,t+s+1
Ci,t+s
)−σ 1 +Rt+s
1 + pii,t+s+1
= 1
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Figure 2.1. Single Currency Regime - Home productivity shock
- impulse response functions of price levels and interest rates
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Figure 2.2. Two-Currency Regime - Home productivity shock
- impulse response functions of price levels and interest rates
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Figure 2.3. Single Currency Regime - Home expenditure shock
- impulse response functions of price levels and interest rates
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Figure 2.4. Two-Currency Regime - Home expenditure shock
- impulse response functions of price levels and interest rates
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Chapter3
Business Cycle Synchronization
between the Great Britain and the
United States
Abstract
In this project, we take up the topic of business cycle synchronization between
the Great Britain and the United States. In order to explore this research topic,
we examine the relationship between the UK and the US economies for the past
five decades. In particular, we measure the synchronization between these two
economies, by dating their business cycles and finding the turning points in their
cycles. We adopt a GMM analytical framework, as we want to seek a model that
is free in measuring synchronization, and we also want to seek estimates that are
robust to serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. Under our GMM framework,
we conduct single and joint synchronization tests between the UK and the US for
each type of business cycles. From these synchronization tests, we find evidence
of correlation between the UK and the US business cycles, and in particular, the
US leads the UK for all three types of business cycles.
JEL Classification: C18, C22, C32, E32.
Key Words: Business Cycle, Turning Point, GMM (Generalized Methods of Mo-
ments).
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3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Motivation
A common saying is that:“when the US sneezes, the rest of the world catches a
cold.”1 Commonly used sayings sometimes represent distilled wisdom whilst at
other times they represent mistaken inferences.
This research project investigates the broad question of whether the saying just
cited represents distilled wisdom or mistaken inference. In Section 4.1.3, we refine
this broad question down into a set of research questions that can be answered in
a research paper.
Why is this question interesting? From the perspective of a policy maker, it is
critical to understand the relationship between the UK and US economies. From
the point view of an economist, it is also relevant and interesting to investigate
whether models adequately capture the linkages in the business cycles between
the UK and the US.
3.1.2 Project Topic
To address the broad questions outlined in Section 4.1.1, we study the business
cycles in the UK and the US, with a focus on the topic of business cycle syn-
chronization between these two countries. In particular, we attempt to identify
and describe the main statistical characteristics of the UK and US business cycles
during the past few decades, investigate whether expansionary (or recessionary)
periods in one country are independent of the timing of expansions (or recessions)
in the other country, measure the degree of synchronization between the UK and
US economies, and consider among other things, the reasons for the connection
between the business cycles in the UK and the US during the periods of time
under study.
3.1.3 Research Questions
There are a few research questions which are addressed in this project. How to
measure the synchronization between the business cycles in the UK and the US?
1By a Google search, we are able to find more than 100 such quotes in the media over the
past years.
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How synchronized (or non-synchronized) are the UK and the US business cycles?
What role does the correlation of GDP play in the synchronization of business
cycles? How unusual is it that there was a classical cycle recession in the US in
the Year 2001 but not one in the UK? Is this evidence of non-synchronization or
is it just down to randomness?
3.1.4 Roadmap
In this paper, we attempt to answer our research questions by adopting the syn-
chronization measures that are proposed in Harding and Pagan (2006a). Building
from that, we extend their work by proceeding with the UK and US time-series
data, with which we date their business cycles and find the turning points in their
cycles. Under a GMM framework, we apply both single and joint synchronization
tests, in order to answer the questions on the business cycle synchronization be-
tween the UK and the US.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 4.2, the concepts of
cycles are explored and comparisons among them are made with the various defi-
nitions that exist in the literature. In Section 4.3, we date the business cycles and
find the turning points in the cycles. Next, we introduce in Section 4.4 the moment
conditions for the estimation of parameters which are related to the measurement
of synchronization between the UK and the US business cycles. Then, we apply
single and joint non-synchronization tests to the two economies in Section 4.5. As
an extension, we also conduct correlation tests between the UK binary states and
the US lagged or led binary states, and correlation tests between the growth rates
of the UK GDP and the lagged or led growth rates of the US GDP. Section 4.6
concludes.
3.2 Measures of Cycles
Cycles are defined in terms of turning points2. In the classical work on “Measur-
ing Business Cycles” by Burns and Mitchell (1946), they define specific cycles in
a series yt in terms of turning points along its sample path. This tradition has
been following and been central to the work at the National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER), and other institutions, such as the International Monetary
2See Section 4.3 for a discussion on turning points.
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Fund (IMF)3 and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD).4 These institutions measure the business cycle through locating the turn-
ing points in the series which are taken to represent the aggregate level of economic
activity.
There are several different notions of a business cycle5, among which the clas-
sical cycle and the growth cycle are the most common focus in the business cycle
literature. The classical cycle refers to the recurrence of expansions and contrac-
tions in the absolute level of aggregate economic activity. On the other hand,
the growth cycle reflects the fluctuations in the rate of economic growth, which
takes the long-run trend rate of growth of the economy into account (Boehm and
Moore, 1984). Harding and Pagan (2005) locate three traditions in this branch of
literature, where the classical cycle is identified by the turning points in the level
of the variable, the growth cycle is identified by the turning points in the level of
the variable less a permanent component, and the acceleration cycle is identified
by the turning points in the growth rate in the variable, which could be either a
quarterly, or annual growth rate.
From a historical perspective, the classical cycle has been a major concern of
the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), and its modified concept -
the growth cycle has been the concentration of the International Economic Indi-
cator (IEI) project at the NBER. Although the growth cycle has received much
more justifiable attention since the 1960s, both of these cycle concepts are very
useful for the development of business cycle theory among academic economists
and policy-making advisors, which is due to the fact that the knowledge of these
two cycles deepens our understanding of the essence of the recurring fluctuations
in the economy. See Boehm (1982, 1983); Boehm and Moore (1984); and Moore
and Zarnowitz (1984). On top of that, Harding and Pagan (2006a) point out that
the choice of activity variable in the acceleration cycle means that we would be
studying a cycle in the growth rates as distinct from the growth cycle.
In our synchronization measurement, we are interested in several measures of
the business cycle, and we employ three types of cycles. They are classical cycle,
growth cycle and acceleration cycle. Binary random variables are used to sum-
3See IMF(2002).
4See http://www.oecd.org/std/cli.
5See Harding and Pagan (2006b) for a description of more ways to measure the business cycle.
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marize the expansion and contraction phases of business cycles. Each of them is
defined in turn.
3.2.1 Classical Cycle
For the classical cycle, we use the turning points in the logarithm of the real GDP
level, ln(GDPt).
Let SCUK,t be the binary variable that represents the classical cycle for the UK,
and let SCUS,t be the binary variable that represents the classical cycle for the US.
SCUK,t and S
C
US,t take the value of one if the country is in a classical expansion
at date t, and take the value of zero if it is in a classical recession at date t.
In the classical cycle, the peaks measure the dates from which economic activ-
ity suffers a sustained decline. On the other hand, the classical cycle troughs
measure the dates from which economic activity ends its decline and begins a
sustained increase.
3.2.2 Growth Cycle
For the growth cycle, we use the turning points in ln(GDPt−a−bt), where (a+bt)
is the permanent component in the GDP data. (a is the time-invariant part, whilst
bt is the time-varying part in the trend component of the GDP data.)
Let SGUK,t be the binary variable that represents the growth cycle for the UK,
and let SGUS,t be the binary variable that represents the growth cycle for the US.
SGUK,t and S
G
US,t take the value of one if the country is in a growth expansion
at date t, and take the value of zero if it is in a growth recession at date t.
The growth cycle peaks measure the points at which growth moves from being
above trend rate to below trend rate, while the growth cycle troughs measure the
points at which growth moves from below trend rate to above trend rate for a
sustained period of time.
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3.2.3 Acceleration Cycle
For the acceleration cycle, we use the turning points in ln(GDPt) − ln(GDPt−4),
where 4 means 4 quarters, which is one year.
Let SAUK,t be the binary variable that represents the acceleration cycle for the
UK, and let SAUS,t be the binary variable that represents the acceleration cycle for
the US.
SAUK,t and S
A
US,t take the value of one if the country is in an acceleration expan-
sion at date t, and take the value of zero if it is in an acceleration recession at date t.
The peaks in the acceleration cycle measure the dates at which growth begins
to slow down, whilst the troughs in the acceleration cycle measure the dates at
which the rate of economic growth begins to increase.
3.3 Turning Points
The key idea behind business cycles is that a turning point occurs when one phase
of expansion (or contraction) ends and another phase of contraction (or expansion)
starts (Harding and Pagan, 2007). In order to detect the business cycle with a
single series, we can therefore think of cycles in terms of turning points in the time
series on the aggregate activity in the economy. However, this is a visual exercise,
that is, it is done by eye and judgement. In some sense, this is like “eye econo-
metrics”. Examples include the charts by Burns and Mitchell (1946), Boehm and
Moore (1984), and the business cycle dating committee at the National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER).
As modern economists, we want to go beyond this eye inspection and subjec-
tive judgement. To avoid this subjectivity, we have to check the time-series data
with closer inspection. There are several reasons why a potential turning point
might not be a real one. For instance, seasonal patterns6, phase persistence7,
phase length8, turning point alternation9, etc. Hence, we need some considerable
6There are some examples of seasonal patterns, such as war and strikes.
7Phase persistence refers to the fact that a phase has to persist for some time, and if it lasts
for only a short period of time, then some turning points will have to eliminated.
8Phase length follows two quarter rule, proposed by Harding and Pagan.
9A peak should be followed by a trough, and a trough should be followed by a peak, etc.
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amount of scientific judgement and have to resort to computational methods on
the final selection of the turning points.
3.3.1 Theoretical Development
From the perspective of theoretical development, Bry and Boschan (1971) first at-
tempt to automate turning point selection. They developed a computer program
which incorporated various smoothing and outlier detection rules, enforced judge-
ments about the lengths of phase and cycle, and ensured that the turning points
alternated. Their work involved the same kind of steps as in Burns and Mitchell
(1946), and also reproduced Burns and Mitchell’s decisions on turning points in a
given set of time series. In their computer program, they adopted the rule that the
phases must be at least 5 months in duration, whilst a complete cycle must last at
least 15 months in length. But their procedure was implemented in FORTRAN on
a digital computer, so numerical values had to be assigned specifically to test phase
length.10 In 1993, Mark Watson and Edwin Denson11 developed their GAUSS pro-
gram which implemented the Bry-Boschan (BB) business cycle dating algorithm.12
Building from that, Harding and Pagan (2002) develop the quarterly adaption
of the Bry and Boschan (1971). Their dating algorithm is called BBQ, which
stands for “Bry-Boschan Quarter”. This computer program identifies the turning
points in each of the time series via peak and trough dating. The BBQ program
omits the smoothing rules in the BB algorithm but retains the key principles of
the BB program. The modified BBQ (MBBQ) program is developed by James
Engel.13
3.3.2 Analytical Framework
When we discuss business cycles, we have the tendency to present graphs of time
series and recognize a cycle from the turning points in the time series under our
study. These turning points are the peaks and troughs in the cycles, and the
expansions and contractions are the periods between these cycle peaks and cycle
troughs.
10For more information on BB’s business cycle dating algorithm, see Chapter 2 of “Cyclical
Analysis of Time Series: Selected Programs and Computer Program” in Bry and Boschan (1971).
11They did the work with the help of Robert King.
12An early version of this program was used in Watson (1994).
13James Engel’s business cycle dating programs can be found on the website of National Centre
for Econometric Research (NCER) in Australia. http://www.ncer.edu.au/data/
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Harding and Pagan (2007) set some rules for locating the turning points in the
cycle. When we refer to a turning point, it usually involves the location of local
maxima and minima in the series, and this involves a change in the sign of the
first derivative in discrete time, but is taken to be the first difference of the series
under investigation. Hence, the rule involves studying quantities, such as ∆yt,
where the series being studied is yt. Same methods apply for other definitions of
economic variables.
To illustrate this turning point rule, we can focus on a change in the variable
yt, ∆yt, and estimate the derivative by using an average of the yt over some win-
dow around the potential turning point.
A peak in yt at time t is being detected by examining whether the following
sequence holds:
{∆2yt > 0,∆yt > 0,∆yt+1 < 0,∆2yt+2 < 0}
Likewise, a trough in yt at time t is being detected by examining whether the
following sequence holds:
{∆2yt < 0,∆yt < 0,∆yt+1 > 0,∆2yt+2 > 0}
This is the BBQ dating rule in our analytical framework for finding the turning
points in the cycle.
3.3.3 Cycle Dating
We apply the BBQ algorithm to the time-series GDP data for the UK and the US,
date the three types of their business cycles, and find the turning points in each
type of the cycles for these two economies. Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 summarize
the dating results of the turning points in the classical cycle, growth cycle and
acceleration cycle for the UK and the US. From these two tables, we find that
there are some features about the business cycles in these two economies. Among
the three types of business cycles, the classical cycle has the fewest turning points,
while the acceleration cycle has the most turning points for both economies. On
the other hand, for all three business cycles, the first turning points start in the
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Table 3.1. Business Cycle Turning Points - UK
Classical Growth Acceleration
Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak
1955q3 1955q3 1956q3 1957q2
1956q3 1961q2 1958q2 1960q1 1958q1 1960q1
1961q4 1973q2 1963q1 1964q4 1962q1 1964q1
1974q1 1974q3 1966q4 1968q1 1966q4 1968q1
1975q3 1979q2 1970q1 1970q4 1970q1 1970q4
1981q1 1990q2 1972q1 1973q1 1971q2 1973q1
1991q3 2008q1 1974q1 1974q3 1974q1 1975q1
2009q2 1975q3 1976q4 1975q3 1976q4
1977q2 1979q2 1977q4 1979q2
1981q2 1982q2 1980q2 1983q4
1982q4 1984q1 1984q3 1985q2
1984q3 1988q4 1986q2 1988q1
1993q2 1994q4 1991q2 1994q3
1995q2 2001q1 1999q2 2000q2
2001q4 2004q1 2002q1 2004q1
2005q1 2006q1 2005q1 2006q1
2006q3 2007q4 2006q4 2007q3
2010q1 2010q3 2009q1 2010q3
middle 1950s, and the latest turning point occurred during the Global Financial
Crisis (GFC).
3.4 GMM Framework
In the previous section, we date the business cycles and find the turning points in
the cycles for the UK and the US, which includes the turning points in the three
types of business cycles, that is, classical cycle, growth cycle and acceleration cy-
cle. As a by-product of the cycle dating, we also find the binary states of business
cycles in these two economies.
In this section, we estimate the parameters which are related to the measures
of synchronization between the UK and the US, by making use of the binary
states from the cycle dating in the previous section. The notations and computer
codes are based on and adapted from Hamilton (1994), and Harding and Pagan
(2006a).
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Table 3.2. Business Cycle Turning Points - US
Classical Growth Acceleration
Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak
1957q3 1955q3 1956q3 1957q3
1958q1 1960q1 1958q2 1960q1 1958q1 1959q2
1960q4 1969q3 1961q1 1966q1 1961q1 1962q1
1970q4 1973q4 1967q4 1969q1 1963q1 1964q1
1975q1 1980q1 1970q4 1973q2 1964q4 1965q4
1980q3 1981q3 1975q2 1976q1 1967q2 1968q2
1982q1 1990q3 1976q4 1977q3 1970q4 1973q1
1991q1 2007q4 1978q1 1978q4 1975q1 1976q2
2009q2 1980q3 1981q1 1977q1 1978q4
1982q4 1986q1 1980q3 1981q3
1987q1 1989q1 1982q3 1984q1
1991q4 1992q4 1987q1 1988q2
1993q3 1994q4 1991q1 1992q4
1996q1 2000q2 1993q3 1994q3
2003q1 2003q4 1995q4 1997q3
2004q3 2005q1 1998q3 2000q2
2009q3 2010q2 2001q4 2002q3
2003q1 2004q1
2007q1 2007q3
2009q2 2010q3
In what follows, we use generalized methods of moments (GMM) as the ana-
lytical framework. There are three reasons for adopting the GMM framework.
First, the main reason why we use GMM is that we want to seek a model which is
free in measuring synchronization. Second, economic theory only provides us with
information about the moments, but it does not provide information about the
distribution from which the shocks are drawn. Unless one is willing to go beyond
the information provided by economic theory, it is not possible to use maximum
likelihood to estimate these models. Third, we also want to seek estimates that
are robust to serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. That is why we adopt this
methodology over a conventional bi-variate time-series analysis on GDP growth,
as our concerns go beyond information on the size of the transmission of shocks
and on any lead-lag relations.
The correlation between the two binary series is:
ρjUK,US = Corr(S
j
UK,t, S
j
US,t)
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=
Cov(SjUK,t, S
j
US,t)√
V ar(SjUK,t)V ar(S
j
US,t)
The covariance14 is
Cov(SjUK,t, S
j
US,t) = E(S
j
UK,t − µjUK)(SjUS,t − µjUS)
= E(SjUK,tS
j
US,t)− µjUKµjUS
where j = classical cycle, growth cycle, acceleration cycle.
The variance15 in each binary series is:
V ar(Sji,t) = µ
j
i (1− µji )
where i = UK, US.
3.4.1 Moment Conditions
We have the following moment conditions in the system.
ESji,t − µji = 0 (3.1)
where i = UK, US; j = classical cycle, growth cycle, acceleration cycle.
E
[ (SjUK,t − µjUK)(SjUS,t − µjUS)√
µjUK(1− µjUK)µjUS(1− µjUS)
− ρjUK,US
]
= 0 (3.2)
where j = classical cycle, growth cycle, acceleration cycle.16
Let θ′ = (µjUK , µ
j
US, ρ
j
UK,US) be a vector of parameters for the population means
(µjUK , µ
j
US) in the UK and the US binary states, and the population correlation
ρjUK,US between these binary states.
14See the Mathematics/Statistics Appendix for the derivation of this covariance between the
binary series.
15See the Mathematics/Statistics Appendix for the derivation of this variance in each binary
series.
16Compare this equation with Harding and Pagan (2006a: p69), equation (26) to see the
difference. Here we have two binary states for the UK and the US, respectively.
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Let S be a T × 2 matrix with typical elements SjUK and SjUS in the two columns,
respectively.
Then we can write the moment conditions as follows:
mt(θ, St) =

SjUK,t − µjUK
SjUS,t − µjUS
(SjUK,tS
j
US,t − µjUKµjUS)/
√
µjUK(1− µjUK)µjUS(1− µjUS)− ρjUK,US

′
where mt is a T × 3 matrix17, and
g(θ, {S}Tt=1) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
mt(θ, St) (3.3)
In the mt matrix, we have 3 moment conditions, and we also have 3 parameters
in the system, θ′ = (µjUK , µ
j
US, ρ
j
UK,US), so this is a just identified system.
3.4.2 Moment Estimation
Since this is a just identified model, we can use the method of moments. The
estimators can be solved analytically via the following equations:
µji =
1
T
T∑
t=1
Sji,t (3.4)
ρjUK,US =
1
T
∑T
t=1(S
j
UK,tS
j
US,t − µjUKµjUS)√
µjUK(1− µjUK)µjUS(1− µjUS)
(3.5)
The next step is to obtain the S matrix.18
Let θˆ′ = (µˆjUK , µˆ
j
US, ρˆ
j
UK,US) be the vector of parameters for the sample means
in the UK and the US binary states and the sample correlation between these
binary states.
17Compare this matrix with the one in Harding and Pagan (2006a: p69), equation (27) to see
the difference. There they have a T × 1 matrix.
18See the Mathematics/Statistics Appendix for a discussion on the consistent estimation of
the S matrix.
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The Newey-West (1987) estimate19 of S is20:
SˆT = Γˆ0,T +
q∑
v=1
(1− v
q + 1
)(Γˆv,T + Γˆ
′
v,T ) (3.6)
where q is the window width.
Γˆv,T =
1
T
T∑
t=v+1
[mt(θˆ, St)][mt(θˆ, St−v)]′ (3.7)
where θˆ is an initial consistent estimator of θ0.
The window width q can be chosen either by using a “plug in rule” as in Harding
and Pagan (2006a), or via an optimization procedure developed by Newey and
West (1994). Following Harding and Pagan (2006a), we apply the “plug in rule”
and set q equal to the integer part of [T − n(n− 1)/2]1/3, where T is the number
of rows in the mt matrix,
21 and n is the number of columns in the mt matrix.
22
By this method, we get q = 5. On the other hand, we can also apply [T − p]1/3,
where p is the number of parameters.23 By this optimization procedure, we also
get q = 5.24
3.5 Synchronization Tests
In order to test for synchronization between the UK and the US economies, there
are two possible tests. One test is to test for non-synchronization, while the
other test is to test for perfect positive synchronization. We apply the non-
synchronization test in this section.25 By applying this test, we would like to
investigate the research question: How synchronized are the UK and the US busi-
ness cycles?
19A Newey-West estimator is used to provide an estimate of the covariance matrix of the
parameters of a regression-type model when this model is applied in situations where the standard
assumptions of regression analysis do not apply. The estimator is used to try to overcome
autocorrelation, or correlation, and heteroskedasticity in the error terms in the models. This is
often used to correct the effects of correlation in the error terms in regressions applied to time
series data.
20See Hamilton (1994: p414), equations [14.1.19] and [14.1.20].
21T=191.
22n=3.
23p=3.
24[T − n(n− 1)/2]1/3 = [191− 3(3− 1)/2]1/3 = 5.7.
25See the Mathematics/Statistics Appendix for the discussion on perfect synchronization tests.
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3.5.1 Single Non-Synchronization Tests
It turns out that a good measure of the degree of business cycle synchronization26
is provided by:
ρjUK,US = Corr(S
j
UK,t, S
j
US,t)
Analytical Framework
To test for non-synchronization, we have the null hypothesis and the alternative
hypothesis as follows:
H0 : ρ
j
UK,US = 0
H1 : ρ
j
UK,US 6= 0
where j = classical cycle, growth cycle, acceleration cycle.
Following Section 4.4, we let θˆ′ = (µjUK , µ
j
US, 0) be the restricted parameter vector
for the (strict) non-synchronization (SNS) case, where ρjUK,US = 0.
Under the null hypothesis H0, the test statistic is:
WSNS =
√
Tg(θ0, {S}Tt=1)′Sˆ−1T
√
Tg(θ0, {S}Tt=1) (3.8)
Under the alternative hypothesis H1, the model is exactly identified, and hence
m¯(θˆ) = 0. The test statistic is a J test, the form of which is:
J = m¯(θj0)S
−1
T m¯(θ
j
0)
′ (3.9)
The J test is distributed χ21 asymptotically.
For all three types of business cycles, the test statistic is for the null hypothesis
of non-synchronization and has a χ2 distribution at 1 degree of freedom, because
there is only one restriction here.
The Results
In this part, we analyze the relationship between the UK and the US business cy-
26See, for example, Harding and Pagan (2006a).
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Table 3.3. Single Non-Synchronization Tests - UK and US
1955-2011 Classical Growth Acceleration
µUK 0.881579 0.486842 0.442982
µUS 0.868421 0.52193 0.482456
ρUK,US 0.339221 0.247092 0.322864
Test Statistic 7.530743 5.837898 10.38813
p-value 0.006065 0.015685 0.001268
cles. By inspection of the results from the synchronization tests, we characterize
both the changing nature of the UK output growth and its evolving relationship
with the US output growth since the late 1950s. Table 4.3 provides the results
from the single non-synchronization tests, in each type of the business cycles for
the entire sample period. For all three types of the cycles, the test statistics and
the p-values are statistically significant. Hence, we reject the null, and conclude
that the classical cycle, the growth cycle, and the accelerate cycle are all synchro-
nized between the UK and the US economies. Overall, this table provides us with
some comparative evidence on the synchronization between the UK cycles with
those of the US. It suggests that the UK economy is highly synchronized with the
US.
Extension: Leading Indicator Approach
In the previous part, we conduct synchronization tests in the contemporaneous
binary states of the business cycles and find that all three types of business cycles
are synchronized between the UK and the US for the entire sample period. In
this part, we conduct some correlation tests in the leads and lags of the binary
states for the US in this part, through which we want to investigate further the
relationship between the UK and US business cycles. Previously, we apply the
non-synchronization tests to the binary states27 in the three types of business cy-
cles for the UK and the US. In this extension, we fix the binary states for the UK,
but lag and lead the binary states for the US by 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 periods28, respec-
tively. For example, if we lag the US binary states by 8 periods, then it means that
the US business cycle leads the UK cycle by 2 years; while if we lead the US binary
states by 8 periods, then it means that the US cycle lags that of the UK by 2 years.
27These binary states are the “by-products” from cycle dating in Section 4.3.3.
288 periods = 8 quarters = 2 years.
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Table 3.4. Correlation between Binary States - UK and US
Periods ρC pvalueC ρG pvalueG ρA pvalueA
-8 -0.13693 1.18× 10−9 0.137069 0.186253 -0.06502 0.509423
-7 -0.13622 1.09× 10−9 0.077245 0.471963 -0.13241 0.160761
-6 -0.05413 0.294544 0.018036 0.860676 -0.13671 0.085632
-5 0.066786 0.454561 0.022621 0.818801 -0.1229 0.125779
-4 0.143133 0.189027 0.062861 0.505698 -0.08252 0.370379
-3 0.257496 0.024485 0.138272 0.1558 0.028999 0.754461
-2 0.338387 0.011309 0.204326 0.040585 0.157418 0.058494
-1 0.338806 0.010186 0.244595 0.01910 0.267077 0.00165
0 0.339221 0.006065 0.247092 0.015685 0.322864 0.001268
1 0.298624 0.008026 0.217713 0.022217 0.284815 0.002558
2 0.217763 0.049286 0.170368 0.054449 0.139612 0.072155
3 0.177028 0.091663 0.176079 0.055485 0.011123 0.89242
4 0.136236 0.187614 0.136515 0.159638 -0.10047 0.283016
5 0.0551 0.524345 0.060574 0.556906 -0.17696 0.03996
6 0.054477 0.526891 -0.00732 0.940729 -0.19162 0.028637
7 0.013507 0.874798 -0.05761 0.526818 -0.18821 0.031655
8 0.012844 0.883393 -0.09906 0.276333 -0.12121 0.222114
The correlation between the binary states in GDP is:
ρS,jUK,US = Corr(S
j
UK,t, S
j
US,t+l)
where l = −8,−7,−6,−5,−4,−3,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.
Then we proceed to find the correlation between the binary states for the UK
and the lagged or led binary states for the US, in each type of business cycles.
This gives us a good picture of the correlation between the business cycles in these
two economies. Table 4.4 presents the correlation between the binary states for
each type of business cycles in the UK and the US. From these results in the table,
we can see that the US classical cycle leads the UK cycle by 3 periods; the US
growth cycle leads that of the UK by 2 periods; and the US acceleration cycle
leads the UK by 1 period. Hence, the US leads the UK for all three types of
business cycles.
3.5.2 Joint Non-Synchronization Tests
Single non-synchronization tests are conducted in Section 4.5.1 to test the hy-
pothesis that for each type of the business cycles, none of them are synchronized.
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An extension is also discussed in that part. In this subsection, we go on to conduct
our joint non-synchronization tests which test the null hypothesis that all three
types of the business cycles are jointly non-synchronized.
Analytical Framework
To test for joint non-synchronization in all three types of business cycles, we have
the null hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis as follows:
H0 : ρ
C
UK,US = ρ
G
UK,US = ρ
A
UK,US = 0
The alternative hypothesis is that at least one type of the business cycle is syn-
chronized.
In this joint non-synchronization test, the moment conditions become:
mt(θ, St) =

SCUK,t − µCUK
SCUS,t − µCUS
SGUK,t − µGUK
SGUS,t − µGUS
SAUK,t − µAUK
SAUS,t − µAUS
(SCUK,tS
C
US,t − µCUKµCUS)/
√
µCUK(1− µCUK)µCUS(1− µCUS)− ρCUK,US
(SGUK,tS
G
US,t − µGUKµGUS)/
√
µGUK(1− µGUK)µGUS(1− µGUS)− ρGUK,US
(SAUK,tS
A
US,t − µAUKµAUS)/
√
µAUK(1− µAUK)µAUS(1− µAUS)− ρAUK,US

′
where θ′ = (µCUK , µ
C
US, µ
G
UK , µ
G
US, µ
A
UK , µ
A
US, ρ
C
UK,US, ρ
G
UK,US, ρ
A
UK,US), and S = (S
C
UK ∼
SCUS ∼ SGUK ∼ SGUS ∼ SAUK ∼ SAUS).
The Results
From the results for the joint non-synchronization tests, the test statistic = 14.54598,
and the p-value = 0.002249. So we reject the null, and conclude that at least one
type of the business cycles is synchronized between the two economies. This result
is consistent with our finding in the single non-synchronization tests.
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3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we focus on the real GDP as the time-series data in which the busi-
ness cycles are to be located; and we employ three types of business cycles, which
include classical cycle, growth cycle and acceleration cycle. Then we date these
three business cycles and find the turning points in each type of cycles. Building
from that, we use the GMM framework and estimate the parameters related to the
measures of synchronization between the UK and the US for each type of business
cycles. Under the GMM framework, we apply tests for single cycle synchroniza-
tion, and find that the business cycles are synchronized between the UK and the
US for the entire sample period. As an extension, we conduct tests in testing the
correlation between the binary states in the UK and those lagged and led binary
states in the US, for each type of business cycles. From these correlation tests
between the binary states, we find that the US leads the UK for all three types
of business cycles. In parallel to the single synchronization tests, we also conduct
joint non-synchronization tests in the last part of this paper, where we find that
there is evidence of joint synchronization, consistent with those found in the single
non-synchronization tests.
Before closing this paper, let us return to the research questions that are asked in
Section 4.1.2.
First of all, how to measure the synchronization between the business cycles in the
UK and the US? One way to answer this, as is done in this paper, is to examine the
real GDP data in these two economies, to employ three types of business cycles,
and to test whether the business cycles are singly or jointly synchronized. There
still remain some problems. For example, it usually requires many more years of
data to determine with any degree of confidence whether the two business cycles
are indeed synchronized over the different courses of their economic growth and
development in history.
Second, how synchronized (or non-synchronized) are the UK and the US busi-
ness cycles? The single synchronization tests show that the two economies are
highly synchronized in their business cycles. The joint synchronization test con-
firms our finding from the single synchronization tests.
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Third, how unusual is it that there was a classical cycle recession in the US in
2001 but not one in the UK? Is this evidence of non-synchronization or is it just
down to randomness? The classical cycle recession in the US in 2001 was identi-
fied by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), which chooses their
turning points with reference to not only the GDP data, but also other economic
fundamental variables, with a special focus on the unemployment rate. In the
measurement here, we only focus on the real GDP data. So we get slightly dif-
ferent results from theirs. This difference is due to the choice of variables and
methodology.
Appendix
A1. Mathematical derivation
Binary Covariance Derivation
The derivation of the covariance between the two binary series is:
Cov(SjUK,t, S
j
US,t) = E[(S
j
UK,t − µjUK)(SjUS,t − µjUS)]
= E(SjUK,tS
j
US,t − SjUK,tµjUS − µjUKSjUS,t + µjUKµjUS)
= E(SjUK,tS
j
US,t)− E(SjUK,t)µjUS − µjUKE(SjUS,t) + µjUKµjUS
= E(SjUK,tS
j
US,t)− µjUKµjUS − µjUKµjUS + µjUKµjUS
= E(SjUK,tS
j
US,t)− µjUKµjUS
where j = classical cycle, growth cycle, acceleration cycle.
Binary Variance Derivation
The derivation of the variance in each binary series is:
V ar(Sji,t) = E(S
j
i,t − µji )2
= ESji,t − (µji )2
= µji − (µji )2
= µji (1− µji )
where i = UK, US.
Covariance-Variance Matrix
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The covariance-variance matrix without adjustment for heteroskedasticity and au-
tocorrelation is:
Γ0 =
1
T
m′tmt
Γv =
1
T
mv
′mv
where v = 1, 2, ..., and is just an index that runs from 1 to window width; and
the overline means that we trim v rows from the top of the matrix mt, while the
underline means the we trim v rows from the bottom of the matrix mt. This is
the right way to trim the vectors, such that there are no missing values.
Consistent Estimation
In Section 4.4.2, we cover the moment conditions, where we show the covariance-
variance matrix without and with adjustment for heteroskedasticity and autocorre-
lation. We introduce this statistical background more informally in this appendix.
The asymptotic variance of the sample mean ¯m(θ0) is defined as
S = lim
T→∞
T × E[ ¯m(θ0)′ ¯m(θ0)]
If {mt(θ0)}∞t=−∞ is serially uncorrelated, then S can be consistently estimated
by
S∗T =
1
T
T∑
t=1
mt(θ0)
′mt(θ0)
This estimator is infeasible since θ0 is unknown, and hence it is usual to use the
feasible estimator
SˆT =
1
T
T∑
t=1
mt(θˆ)
′mt(θˆ)
where θˆ is a feasible estimator of θ.
If {mt(θ0)}∞t=−∞ is serially correlated, then some allowance must be made for
that feature. These are several methods for doing this. A popular one due to
Newey and West involves using the following Bartlett kernel with window width
66
q.
S˜T = Γ0,T +
q∑
v=1
(1− v
q + 1
)(Γv,T + Γ
′
v,T )
where
Γv,T =
1
T
T∑
t=1
mt(θˆ)
′mt−v(θˆ)
and the Bartlett kernel is 1− v
q+1
.
Perfect Positive Synchronization Test
Following Section 4.5, it also turns out that for binary series, a necessary condition
for perfect (positive) synchronization between the UK and the US is:
ESjUK,t = µ
j
UK = µ
j
US = ES
j
US,t
To test for perfect positive synchronization, we have the null hypothesis and the
alternative hypothesis as follows:
H0 : µ
j
UK = µ
j
US , ρ
j
UK,US = 1
H1 : µ
j
UK 6= µjUS , ρjUK,US 6= 1
For this perfect positive synchronization test, we are testing at the boundary of
the parameter space. It is not differentiable. We can not apply Taylor series ap-
proximation. It is a half normal distribution. We are required to make adjustment
to the distribution of the test statistics. We need to use distribution theory that
takes this feature of the hypothesis into account.
But given our results in the non-synchronization tests, we already know that
the growth cycle is non-synchronized between the two economies, while the clas-
sical and acceleration cycles are synchronized, the evidence of which is not strong
though. Hence, there is no need to proceed further to test for perfect positive
synchronization.
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Chapter4
Oil Supply Shocks in a Non-Scale
Economic Growth Model
Abstract
This project extends Schubert and Turnovsky (2007) paper by introducing endoge-
nous labor supply into their model economy. Building from that, we investigate
the dynamic effects of a one-time unanticipated permanent change in the price
of imported intermediate good on economic growth. The model considered here
is a “non-scale” economic growth model, in which the economy has access to a
perfect capital market. With the extension of endogenous labor supply, we find
that output, capital, and input usage are all permanently much lower than the
case for fixed labor supply. The short-run impacts on input usage and output are
also larger than those in the fixed labor supply case.
JEL Classification: O41.
Key Words: Economic Growth, Non-Scale Model, Oil Shock.
4.1 Chapter Introduction
Schubert and Turnovsky (2007) build upon the class of model that is developed
by Eicher and Turnovsky (1999) and study the impacts of an increase in the price
of an intermediate input on economic growth of a small open economy. In that
paper, Schubert and Turnovsky assume that the economy is populated with iden-
tical agents and that each individual’s labor supply is fixed at unity.
In this project, we relax that assumption on fixed labor supply as in Schubert
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and Turnovsky (2007) paper, by introducing endogenous labor supply into their
model economy, in order to see how their analytical framework evolves and what
implications this endogenous labor supply has on the dynamic effects of a one-time
unanticipated permanent increase in the price of the imported intermediate good.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model
setup with endogenous labor supply. Section 3 derives the macroeconomic equilib-
rium for this model economy. In section 4, we analyze the effect due to a change
in the price of the intermediate imported input. Section 5 concludes.
4.2 Analytical Framework
Eicher and Turnovsky (1999) develop a one-sector “non-scale” open economy
growth model.1 Building from that, Schubert and Turnovsky (2007) include a
foreign import, which is used as an intermediate input in domestic production.
This economy is small, in the sense that it has no influence on its output price
and input price in the world market. The domestic production includes one traded
good, Y , which can be consumed or invested or exported. There is an imported
intermediate good, which is used solely as an input in domestic production. Its
relative price, expressed in terms of the traded final good, is p. It is assumed that
this relative price of the imported good p remains constant over time.
The departure from Schubert and Turnovsky (2007) model is that we introduce
endogenous labor supply and leisure choice, by relaxing the assumption on fixed
labor supply in this analytical framework.
In our model, a representative agent obtains utility from his/her consumption
and leisure choice, which is represented by an inter-temporal iso-elastic utility
function over an infinite time horizon.
Ui =
∫ ∞
0
1
γ
(
Cil
θ
)γ
e−βtdt (4.1)
where −∞ < γ < 1, θ > 0.
1The “non-scale” growth model is a generalization of the neo-classical growth model to allow
for non-constant returns to scale.
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Ci is each individual’s consumption choice. Each agent is endowed with a unit of
time that is divided between leisure l and labor (1 − l).2 θ measures the substi-
tutability between consumption and leisure in utility by each agent. 1
1−γ measures
the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution. β denotes the agent’s rate of time
preference, which is assumed to be constant over time.
The production function is:
Yi = αL
1−σ−ξ
i K
σ
i Z
ξ
iK
η = α(1− l)1−σ−ξKσi ZξiKη
where 0 < σ < 1, 0 < ξ < 1, 0 < σ + ξ < 1, η < or = or > 0.
α is like a proxy for total factor productivity (TFP) in the domestic production of
the traded good Yi. There are three private factors in producing the traded good
Yi. One factor is each individual’s labor supply Li(= 1− l). The second factor is
private capital Ki. The third factor is imported intermediate good Zi. On top of
that, K is the economy-wide capital stock, with K ≡ NKi.
In addition, η captures the spill-over effect from the economy-wide capital stock
(for example, due to its production network), as in Romer (1986). We also assume
that there are constant returns to scale in the three private factors - Li, Ki, Zi;
but total returns to scale of degree (1 + η) in all factors. Depending on the quali-
tative nature of the spill-over effect, aggregate returns to scale can be increasing,
constant, or decreasing.
The aggregate production function is obtained by summing individual produc-
tion functions over the N agents.
Y = α(1− l)σLNσNKσKZσZ (4.2)
where σL = σN = 1−σ−ξ, σK = σ+η, and σZ = ξ are the shares of labor, capital
and imported input in aggregate output, respectively. Thus, σL+σK +σZ = 1+η
measures total returns to scale of the aggregate production function.
A representative agent accumulates physical capital Ki. The investment in the
accumulation of physical capital is associated with installation costs. We adopt a
2See Turnovsky (2009): pp13.
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quadratic (convex) investment adjust cost function as in Hayashi (1982). Aggre-
gating over the N individuals, this leads to:
Φ(I,K) = I + h
I2
2K
= I
(
1 +
h
2
I
K
)
(4.3)
where the adjustment costs are proportional to the rate (rather than its level) of
investment per unit of installed capital, I
K
. The linear homogeneity of this func-
tion is necessary if a steady-state equilibrium showing ongoing growth is to be
sustained.
For simplicity, it is further assumed that the capital stock does not depreciate,
such that the net rate of capital accumulation per agent, taking population growth
into account, is given by:
K˙i = Ii − nKi
Here n = N˙
N
is the growth rate of population. N is the population size, which
equals total labor supply implied by full employment condition.
At the aggregate level, the economy faces the physical capital accumulation con-
straint:
K˙ = I (4.4)
Domestic agents have access to a perfect world capital market, which allows them
to accumulate bonds from the rest of the world. These world bonds are denom-
inated in terms of the traded good and pay a fixed interest rate r in the world
market, yielding a net rate of return of (r − n) to individual agents. A represen-
tative agent’s budget constraint in the short run, expressed in terms of the traded
good, is:
B˙i = Yi − Ci − pZi − Φ(Ii, Ki) + (r − n)Bi
To the extent that the representative agent’s income from production Yi plus net
interest income (r − n)Bi exceed his consumption Ci, raw material costs pZi, in-
vestment costs Φ(Ii, Ki), he will accumulate his holdings of foreign (traded) bonds,
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that is, Bi > 0. Otherwise, Bi < 0, in which case the agent is a debtor.
The aggregate economy accumulates net foreign bonds, B, that pay an exoge-
nously given world interest rate, r, subject to the accumulation equation:
B˙ = Y − C − pZ − I
(
1 +
h
2
I
K
)
+ rB (4.5)
For illustrational purpose, taxes are abstracted in this analytical framework.
Dynamic Optimization
We consider the general equilibrium that is generated in a centrally planned econ-
omy, in which the social planner chooses C, l, Z and I, together with K and
B, so as to maximize the utility level of a representative agent as represented by
equation (4.1), subject to the aggregate production function (4.2), the aggregate
capital accumulation equation (4.3), and the aggregate resource constraint (4.5).
H =
∫ ∞
0
1
γ
(
C
N
lθ
)γ
e−βtdt− q∗
(
K˙ − I
)
e−βt
−λ
[
B˙ − Y + C + pZ + I
(
1 +
h
2
I
K
)
− rB
]
e−βt
where
Y = α(1− l)σLNσNKσKZσZ
Optimality conditions
The first-order optimality condition with respect to consumption, C is:
N−γCγ−1lθγ = λ (4.6)
The first-order optimality condition with respect to leisure, l is:
N−γθCγlθγ−1 = λσL
Y
1− l (4.7)
The first two optimality conditions give us the consumption-output ratio:
C
Y
=
l
1− l
σL
θ
(4.8)
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The first-order optimality condition with respect to the imported input, Z, is:
Z = σZ
Y
p
(4.9)
The first-order optimality condition with respect to investment, I, is:
1 + h
I
K
= q (4.10)
In these first-order conditions, λ is the shadow value (marginal utility) of wealth
in the form of international traded bonds, q∗ is the shadow value of capital, and
q = q
∗
λ
is the value of capital in terms of the (unitary) price of foreign bonds.
Equation (4.6) is the usual static optimality condition on consumption, which
requires that along an optimal path, the marginal utility of consumption has to
equal the shadow value of wealth. Equation (4.7) determines the optimal leisure
choice. Equation (4.9) is the determination of optimally choosing the level of the
imported input Zi, which is equal to the marginal product of the imported input
to its relative price in terms of the domestic good p. The production function be-
longs to the Cobb-Douglas type, which implies that the demand for the imported
input is directly proportional to output and inversely proportional to its relative
price. Equation (4.10) asserts that the marginal cost of investment is equated
to the marginal value of installed capital q. This gives us a Tobin’s Q theory of
investment.
Euler equations
Next, the Euler condition with respect to foreign bond, B, is:
β − λ˙
λ
= r (4.11)
The Euler condition with respect to capital, K, is:
σK
q
Y
K
+
q˙
q
+
h
2q
(
q − 1
h
)2
= r (4.12)
The Euler conditions are the dynamic efficiency conditions. Equation (4.11) is
the dynamic efficiency condition on foreign bonds, which requires that the rate of
return on consumption, denoted in terms of the traded good, is equal to the net
growth interest rate. This implies a constant growth rate of the agent’s marginal
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utility, with constant rate of time preference β, constant world interest rate r
and constant population growth rate n. Equation (4.12) is the dynamic efficiency
condition on capital stocks, which equates the rate of return on domestic capital
to the rate of return on foreign (traded) bonds. The rate of return on domestic
capital comprises three components. The first component is the marginal output
per unit of installed capital, which is valued at the (shadow) price q. The second
component is the capital gain, and the third component reflects the benefits aris-
ing from the fact that higher capital stock reduces installation costs.
Transversality conditions
Finally, the transversality conditions are:
limt→∞λiBie−βt = 0
limt→∞λiqiKie−βt = 0
These two transversality conditions are imposed in order to ensure that the agent’s
inter-temporal budget constraint is met.
4.3 Macroeconomic Equilibrium
4.3.1 Balanced Growth
Our objective is to analyze the dynamics of the economy in response to an oil
shock along a stationary growth path, and hence we must determine the long-run
growth rate along a balanced growth path for this economy. At the steady states,
q˙ = 0. Equation (4.12) implies that along a balanced growth path, Yi
Ki
remains
constant. Yi
Zi
also remains constant at all points of time, which is implied by the
optimality condition for the imported input - equation (4.9). So along the bal-
anced growth path, Yi, Ki and Zi all grow at a common constant rate. With
identical agents, the aggregate quantities are defined by Y ≡ NYi, K ≡ NKi,
Z ≡ NZi, from which it follows that Y , K and Z also grow at a common rate,
that is, Yˆ = Kˆ = Zˆ.3
Taking percentage change of the aggregate production function and imposing the
long-run equilibrium relationship in the growth rate Yˆ = Kˆ = Zˆ gives us the
3The “hat” denotes the growth rate in the variable.
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steady-state growth rate:
Yˆ ≡ g = σN
1− σK − σZ n =
1− σ − ξ
1− σ − η − ξn (4.13)
Therefore, the equilibrium growth rate depends on the production technology
which is summarized by the shares σj in the aggregate production function. It
also depends on the population growth rate n which is assumed to be exogenous
in this model.
It is assumed that σK + σZ < 1, in order to have a positive balanced growth.
Under constant aggregate returns to scale, the equilibrium growth rate equals
the population growth rate g = n. In the presence of spill-over effect (from the
economy-wide capital stock) as we have in this model, g is bigger or smaller than
n, which depends on the qualitative form of this spill-over effect, η > or < 0, that
is, whether we have increasing or decreasing aggregate returns to scale. This in
turn also decides whether the introduction of an imported raw material aids or
impedes the growth rate in the long run.
4.3.2 Consumption Dynamics
Agent’s growth rate of consumption is determined by taking the time derivative
of the optimality condition on consumption combined with the dynamic efficiency
condition on foreign bonds.
C˙
C
=
1
1− γ
(
r − β − γn+ θγ l˙
l
)
(4.14)
Knife-Edge Condition
When the assumption of inelastic labor supply is relaxed and labor is endoge-
nously supplied, a much stronger knife-edge condition is required. (See Turnovsky
(2002).) This is because the optimality condition on the consumption-output ratio
C
Y
= l
1−l
σL
θ
must now be taken into account. The fraction of time that is allocated
to work is constant in steady state. This relationship thus implies that the steady-
state consumption/output ratio must be constant, and as a result it imposes the
equality of the long-run growth rates of consumption and output.
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At the steady, l˙ = 0, so the consumption dynamics equation (4.14) becomes:
C˙
C
=
r − β − γn
1− γ ≡ ψ (4.15)
Thus, equating (4.13) and (4.14), we must have:
ψ ≡ r − β − γn
1− γ =
σN
1− σK − σZ n ≡ g (4.16)
The condition (4.16) is the knife-edge condition for this growth model. That is,
the return on foreign bonds, given the taste parameters and population growth,
must be such that the implied growth rate of consumption is driven to equal the
growth rate of production, which is determined by the population growth rate in
conjunction with the productive elasticities, in accordance with the “non-scale”
growth model.
4.3.3 Capital Dynamics
The dynamics of capital converge to a long-run steady state growth rate along a
transitional growth path. In order to analyze this path, we first follow Eicher and
Turnovsky (1999) to define the stationary “scale-adjusted” capital stock:
k ≡ K
N
σN
1−σK−σZ
In equilibrium, the growth rate of the aggregate capital stock is:
K˙
K
=
q − 1
h
(4.17)
Then the growth rate of the stationary “scale-adjusted” capital stock is:
k˙
k
=
q − 1
h
− σN
1− σK − σZ n (4.18)
4.3.4 Dynamic System
The aggregate macroeconomic equilibrium is derived from the optimality condi-
tions for individual agents. We begin by taking the time derivatives of: (i) the op-
timality condition for consumption (4.6), (ii) the equilibrium consumption-output
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ratio (4.8), and (iii) the production function (4.2). This leads to the relationships:
−γn+ (γ − 1)C˙
C
+ θγ
l˙
l
= β − r (4.19)
C˙
C
− Y˙
Y
=
l˙
l
+
l˙
1− l (4.20)
Y˙
Y
= − σL
1− σZ
l˙
1− l +
σN
1− σZ n+
σK
1− σZ
K˙
K
(4.21)
The macroeconomic equilibrium can be expressed by the pair of differential equa-
tions in q and l:
q˙ = rq − (q − 1)
2
2h
− σK Y
K
(4.22)
l˙ =
1
F (l)
[
r − β − γn− 1− γ
1− σZ
(
σK
q − 1
h
− σNn
)]
(4.23)
where
F (l) =
1− γ(θ + 1)
l
+
1− γ
1− l
(
1− σL
1− σZ
)
> 0
The dynamic system is (4.22) + (4.23) + (4.18):
q˙ = rq − (q − 1)
2
2h
− σKα
1
1−σZ (1− l)
σZ
1−σZ (p−1σZ)
σZ
1−σZ k
σK+σZ−1
1−σZ
l˙ =
1− γ
F (l)
[
r − β − γn
1− γ −
1
1− σZ
(
σK
q − 1
h
− σNn
)]
k˙ =
(
q − 1
h
− σN
1− σK − σZ n
)
k
where q and l are jump variables, and k is a sluggish variable.
Here, we apply the general knife-edge condition (4.16). The macro dynamic equi-
librium equations become:
q˙ = rq − (q − 1)
2
2h
− σKα
1
1−σZ (1− l)
σZ
1−σZ (p−1σZ)
σZ
1−σZ k
σK+σZ−1
1−σZ
l˙ =
1− γ
F (l)
[
g − 1
1− σZ
(
σK
q − 1
h
− σNn
)]
k˙ =
(
q − 1
h
− g
)
k
80
In order for the domestic capital stock, labor supply and output to converge to a
balanced growth path with a constant rate of growth, the stationary solution to the
dynamic system above must have at least one real solution, when q˙ = k˙ = l˙ = 0.
q˙ = rq˜ − (q˜ − 1)
2
2h
− σKα
1
1−σZ (1− l˜)
σZ
1−σZ (p−1σZ)
σZ
1−σZ k˜
σK+σZ−1
1−σZ = 0
l˙ =
1− γ
F (l˜)
[
g − 1
1− σZ
(
σK
q˜ − 1
h
− σNn
)]
= 0
k˙ =
(
q˜ − 1
h
− g
)
k˜ = 0
From the k˙ = 0 equation, we get:
q˜ = 1 + gh (4.24)
so q˜ is determined by the growth rate g.
Substitute this back into the q˙ = 0 and l˙ = 0 equations, we find that k and l
are jointly determined. So we can take l˜ as given, and solve for k˜.
k˜ =
[
r(1 + gh)− g
2h
2
] 1−σZ
σK+σZ−1
σ
− 1−σZ
σK+σZ−1
K α
− 1
σK+σZ−1 (1− l˜)−
σZ
σK+σZ−1 (p−1σZ)
− σZ
σK+σZ−1(4.25)
Linearize q˙, k˙ and l˙ around their steady states,
q˙
k˙
l˙
 =

a11 a12 a13
a21 a22 a23
a31 a32 a33


q − q˜
k − k˜
l − l˜

where:
a11 = r − g
a12 = −σK(σK + σZ − 1)
1− σZ α
1
1−σZ (1− l˜)
σZ
1−σZ (p−1σZ)
σZ
1−σZ k˜
σK
1−σZ −2
a13 =
σKσZσL
1− σZ α
1
1−σZ (1− l˜)
2σZ−1
1−σZ (p−1σZ)
σZ
1−σZ k˜
σK+σZ−1
1−σZ
a21 =
k˜
h
a22 = 0
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a23 = 0
a31 = −1− γ
F (l˜)
1
1− σZ σK
1
h
a32 = 0
a33 =
1− γ
F (l˜)2
[g − 1
1− σZ (σK
q − 1
h
− σNn)][1− γ(θ + 1)
l2
+
1− γ
(1− l)2 (1−
σL
1− σZ )]
So 
q˙
k˙
l˙
 =

a11 a12 a13
k˜
h
0 0
a31 0 a33


q − q˜
k − k˜
l − l˜

4.3.5 Non-Scale Growth
Recall from section 4.3.3 on the capital dynamics, the dynamics of capital con-
verge to a long-run steady state growth rate along a transitional growth path. In
this section, we also define the stationary “scale-adjusted” imported input and
aggregate output.
The imported input is:
Z = (p−1ασZ)
1
1−σZ (1− l)
σL
1−σZK
σK
1−σZN
σN
1−σZ (4.26)
Expressed in terms of its corresponding “scale-adjusted” per capita quantities,
z =
Z
N
σN
1−σK−σZ
we obtain the direct relationship between the time path of capital and imported
input.
z = (p−1ασZ)
1
1−σZ (1− l)
σL
1−σZ k
σK
1−σZ (4.27)
The aggregate output is:
Y = α
1
1−σZ (p−1σZ)
σZ
1−σZK
σK
1−σZN
σN
1−σZ (4.28)
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Expressed in terms of its corresponding “scale-adjusted” per capita quantities,
y =
Y
N
σN
1−σK−σZ
we obtain the direct relationship between the time path of capital and aggregate
output.
y = α
1
1−σZ (1− l)
σL
1−σZ (p−1σZ)
σZ
1−σZ k
σK
1−σZ (4.29)
4.3.6 Accumulation of Foreign Assets
For this open economy, we consider it to be small in the world financial market.
Due to this, differential growth rates of consumption and domestic output can be
sustained in the equilibrium. This also has implications on its net asset position.
Rewrite the individual consumer’s flow budget constraint here:
B˙i = Yi − Ci − pZi − Φ(Ii, Ki) + (r − n)Bi
Aggregating all the individual consumers’ flow budget constraints, we get the
aggregate net rate of accumulation of traded bonds by the private sector, which
is also the current account balance in this economy.
B˙ = rB + Y − C − pZ − I
(
1 +
h
2
I
K
)
Convert this to “scale-adjusted” form:
b˙ = (r − g)b+ (1− σZ)α
1
1−σZ (p−1σZ)
σZ
1−σZ k
σK
1−σZ − q
2 − 1
2h
k − c
In the Appendix of Schubert and Turnovsky (2007), they show that if the transver-
sality conditions hold, then the linearized solution to the “scale-adjusted” per
capita stock of bonds, starting from the initial stock of bonds, b0, is given by:
b(t) = − M
r − g −
L
r − g − µ1 e
µ1t +
c(0)
r − ψe
(ψ−g)t
where M and L are constants that are defined in their Appendix, and
c(0) = (r − ψ)
[
b0 +
M
r − g +
L
r − g − µ1
]
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As noted in their Appendix, the above equation is the inter-temporal budget
constraint in the economy, which shows that the present value of the resources
available for initial consumption after the investment needs have been met along
the transition path.
4.4 Shock Analysis
In this section, we analyze the impact of an oil shock, which is represented by an
increase in the price of the intermediate input p.
4.4.1 Steady-State Changes
First, we consider the effects of an unanticipated permanent increase in the price
of the imported input (dp > 0) at time t = 0. With perfect foresight, agents’
expectations of the steady-state response determines the dynamic evolution of the
economy. So we start our analysis with the study of the long-run steady state
effects of an increase in the price of the intermediate input.
At the steady state,
q˜ = 1 + gh
This implies that the long-run market price of installed capital q˜ does not change,
because the steady-state growth rate g is independent of the intermediate input
price in the economy.
Rewrite the “scale-adjusted” stationary quantities here:
k˜ = [r(1 + gh)− g
2h
2
]
1−σZ
σK+σZ−1σ
− 1−σZ
σK+σZ−1
K α
− 1
σK+σZ−1 (1− l˜)−
σZ
σK+σZ−1 (p−1σZ)
− σZ
σK+σZ−1
z˜ = (p−1ασZ)
1
1−σZ (1− l˜)
σL
1−σZ k˜
σK
1−σZ
y˜ = α
1
1−σZ (1− l˜)
σL
1−σZ (p−1σZ)
σZ
1−σZ k˜
σK
1−σZ
From these, we see that the price of the imported input has the following long-run
effects on the “scale-adjusted” capital stock, the demand for the imported input,
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and the aggregate output.
dk˜
k˜
= − σZ
1− σK − σZ
(
dp
p
+
dl˜
1− l˜
)
< 0 (4.30)
dz˜
z˜
= − 1
1− σZ (1 +
σKσZ
1− σK − σZ )
dp
p
− 1
1− σZ (σL +
σKσZ
1− σK − σZ )
dl˜
1− l˜ < 0(4.31)
dy˜
y˜
= − σZ
1− σZ (1 +
σK
1− σK − σZ )
dp
p
− 1
1− σZ (σL +
σKσZ
1− σK − σZ )
dl˜
1− l˜ < 0(4.32)
They are all < 0. Therefore, an increase in the price of the imported intermediate
input causes a decrease in the use of the input, which is intuitive. It also reduces
the “scale-adjusted” capital stock and output levels (by different proportionate
amounts) in the economy. Despite the fact that the growth rate of output does
not change in the long run, we will have lower capital, lower output and reduced
usage of the imported input following an oil shock along the new balanced growth
path.
4.4.2 Impact Effects
Recall the “scale-adjusted” stationary imported input and aggregate output are:
z = (p−1ασZ)
1
1−σZ (1− l)
σL
1−σZ k
σK
1−σZ
y = α
1
1−σZ (p−1σZ)
σZ
1−σZ (1− l)
σL
1−σZ k
σK
1−σZ
The z equation shows that if there is an increase in the price of the imported
input, then this will lead to an immediate reduction in its usage. In the short run,
capital stock is fixed. So output production will decrease too.
dz(0)
z˜
= − 1
1− σZ
dp
p
− σL
1− σZ
dl˜
1− l˜ < 0
dy(0)
y˜
= − σZ
1− σZ
dp
p
− σL
1− σZ
dl˜
1− l˜ < 0
Comparing the short-run effects and the long-run effects, we can see that the
short-run decline in both the input usage and in output is less than the long-run
decline. This implies that following the initial decrease, both z(t) and y(t) will
continue to decline towards their steady state as the economy evolves over time.
For the “scale-adjusted” consumption, the initial response results from an increase
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in the price of the imported intermediate input can be derived as:
dc(0)
dp
= (r − ψ)
[
1
r − g
dM
dp
+
1
r − g − µ
dL
dp
]
It can be shown that the eigenvalue µ1 is independent of p, which implies that the
asymptotic speed of convergence is independent of p. As argued by Schubert and
Turnovsky (2007), dc(0)
dp
> 0.
Last but not least, the effect of this import price change on the current account
of this economy is:
db˙(0)
dp
= −(σZp−1α)
1
1−σZ k
σK
1−σZ − qk
h
dq(0)
dp
− dc(0)
dp
< 0
This equation shows that there are two offsetting effects in operation here. The
first effect is the direct effect of the increase in the price of the imported intermedi-
ate input, which decreases its usage, therefore reducing productivity and domestic
output. This has an adverse effect on the trade balance. On the other hand, the
second effect is represented by a reduction in q(0) and a reduction in c(0), which
reduce domestic demand and therefore improve the current account balance.
4.5 Conclusion
In this project, we introduce endogenous labor supply into the analytical frame-
work of Schubert and Turnovsky (2007) paper. By so doing, we further investigate
the impacts of an increase in the price of an imported intermediate input (say oil)
on the dynamics of a small open economy. This macro model also assumes that
the economy has access to a perfect world capital market. Then we apply an oil
shock to this model economy, which is represented by an increase in the price of
the imported intermediate good. Our shock analysis shows that with the extension
of endogenous labor supply, output, capital, and input usage are all permanently
much lower than the case for fixed labor supply. The short-run impacts on input
usage and output are also larger than the fixed labor supply case. By introduc-
ing endogenous labor supply, the changes in the variables (such as output, input
usage, capital) are all in the same direction as in the case for fixed labor supply,
but with a different (larger) magnitude. Same economics intuition applies here as
in the Schubert and Turnovsky (2007) paper. The contribution of this project is
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that it generalizes the Schubert and Turnovsky (2007) paper in the dimension of
labor supply, building from which we investigate the dynamic effects of a change
in the price of imported intermediate good on economic growth.
Appendix
A1. Derivations
Derivation of Equation (4.2):
Y = NYi = α[(1− l)N ]1−σ−ξKσZξKη
= α(1− l)1−σ−ξN1−σ−ξKσ+ηZξ
= α(1− l)σLNσNKσKZσZ
Derivation of Equation (4.4):
K˙i = Ii − nKi
˙(K
N
)
=
I
N
− nK
N
K˙N −KN˙
N2
=
I
N
−K n
N
K˙
N
−K N˙
N2
=
I
N
−K n
N
K˙ −KN˙
N
= I −Kn
K˙ −Kn = I −Kn
K˙ = I
Derivation of Equation (4.5):
B˙i = Yi − Ci − pZi − Φ(Ii, Ki) + (r − n)Bi
= Yi − Ci − pZi − Ii
(
1 +
h
2
Ii
Ki
)
+ (r − n)Bi
˙(B
N
)
=
Y
N
− C
N
− pZ
N
− I
N
(
1 +
h
2
I/N
K/N
)
+ (r − n)B
N
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B˙N −BN˙
N2
= ...
B˙
N
−B N˙
N2
= ...
B˙ −BN˙
N
= Y − C − pZ − I
(
1 +
h
2
I
K
)
+ (r − n)B
B˙ −Bn = ...−Bn
B˙ = Y − C − pZ − I
(
1 +
h
2
I
K
)
+ rB
Derivation of Equation (4.6):
∂H
∂C
=
1
γ
γ
(
C
N
lθ
)γ−1
1
N
lθ − λ = 0
Cγ−1N−γ+1lθ(γ−1)N−1lθ = λ
N−γCγ−1lθγ−θ+θ = λ
N−γCγ−1lθγ = λ
Derivation of Equation (4.7):
∂H
∂l
=
1
γ
γ
(
C
N
lθ
)γ−1
C
N
θlθ−1 + λ
[
ασL(1− l)σL−1(−1)NσNKσKZσZ
]
= 0
θCγ−1+1N−γ+1−1lθ(γ−1)+θ−1 − λσL Y
1− l = 0
θCγN−γlθγ−θ+θ−1 − λσL Y
1− l = 0
N−γθCγlθγ−1 = λσL
Y
1− l
Derivation of Equation (4.8):
N−γθCγlθγ−1
N−γCγ−1lθγ
=
λσL
Y
1−l
λ
θC
l
=
σLY
1− l
C
Y
=
l
1− l
σL
θ
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Derivation of Equation (4.9):
∂H
∂Z
= −λ [−α(1− l)σLNσNKσKσZZσZ−1 + p] = 0
−α(1− l)σLNσNKσKσZZσZ−1 + p = 0
−σZ Y
Z
= −p
σZ
Y
Z
= p
Y
Z
=
p
σZ
Z
Y
=
σZ
p
Z = σZ
Y
p
Derivation of Equation (4.10):
∂H
∂I
= −q∗(−1)e−βt − λ
(
1 + h
I
K
)
e−βt = 0
q∗ − λ
(
1 + h
I
K
)
= 0
q∗ = λ
(
1 + h
I
K
)
q∗
λ
=
(
1 + h
I
K
)
q = 1 + h
I
K
1 + h
I
K
= q
Derivation of Equation (4.11):
∂H
∂B
=
d
dt
(
∂H
∂B˙
)
−λ(−r)e−βt = d
dt
(−λe−βt)
rλe−βt = −λ˙e−βt − λe−βt(−β)
... = −λ˙e−βt + βλe−βt
rλ = −λ˙+ βλ
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r = − λ˙
λ
+ β
r = β − λ˙
λ
β − λ˙
λ
= r
Derivation of Equation (4.12):
∂H
∂K
=
d
dt
(
∂H
∂K˙
)
[
−λ
(
(−1)α(1− l)σLNσNσKKσK−1ZσZ + h
2
I2(−1) 1
K2
)]
e−βt = ...[
λσK
Y
K
+ λ
h
2
(
q − 1
h
)2]
e−βt =
d
dt
(−q∗e−βt)
... = −q˙∗e−βt − q∗e−βt(−β)
... = −q˙∗e−βt + βq∗e−βt
λσK
Y
K
+ λ
h
2
(
q − 1
h
)2
= −q˙∗ + βq∗
σK
Y
K
+
h
2
(
q − 1
h
)2
= − q˙
∗
λ
+ β
q∗
λ
... = −
˙(qλ)
λ
+ βq
... = − q˙λ+ qλ˙
λ
+ βq
... = −q˙ − q
(
λ˙
λ
)
+ βq
σK
q
Y
K
+
h
2q
(
q − 1
h
)2
= − q˙
q
− λ˙
λ
+ β
σK
q
Y
K
+
q˙
q
+
h
2q
(
q − 1
h
)2
= β − λ˙
λ
= r
Derivation of Equation (4.14):
N−γCγ−1lθγ = λ
log
(
N−γCγ−1lθγ
)
= logλ
logN−γ + logCγ−1 + loglθγ = logλ
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−γlogN + (γ − 1)logC + θγlogl = logλ
−γdlogN + (γ − 1)dlogC + θγdlogl = dlogλ
−γ N˙
N
+ (γ − 1)C˙
C
+ θγ
l˙
l
=
λ˙
λ
= β − r
−γn+ (γ − 1)C˙
C
+ θγ
l˙
l
= β − r
(γ − 1)C˙
C
= β − γ + γn− θγ l˙
l
C˙
C
=
1
γ − 1(β − γ + γn− θγ
l˙
l
)
=
1
1− γ (r − β − γn+ θγ
l˙
l
)
Derivation of Equation (4.21):
Y = α(1− l)σLNσNKσKZσZ
Y˙
Y
= −σL l˙
1− l + σN
N˙
N
+ σK
K˙
K
+ σZ
Z˙
Z
Y˙
Y
= −σL l˙
1− l + σNn+ σK
K˙
K
+ σZ
Z˙
Z
Y˙
Y
= −σL l˙
1− l + σNn+ σK
K˙
K
+ σZ
Y˙
Y
Y˙
Y
− σZ Y˙
Y
= −σL l˙
1− l + σNn+ σK
K˙
K
(1− σZ) Y˙
Y
= −σL l˙
1− l + σNn+ σK
K˙
K
Y˙
Y
= − σL
1− σZ
l˙
1− l +
σN
1− σZ n+
σK
1− σZ
K˙
K
Derivation of Equation (4.22): From equation (4.12),
σK
q
Y
K
+
q˙
q
+
h
2q
(q − 1
h
)2
= r
q˙
q
= r − σK
q
Y
K
− h
2q
(
q − 1
h
)2
q˙ = rq − h
2
(q − 1)2
h2
− σK Y
K
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q˙ = rq − (q − 1)
2
2h
− σK Y
K
where
Y = α(1− l)σLNσNKσKZσZ
in which
Z = σZ
Y
p
Substitute Z expression into Y equation:
Y = α(1− l)σLNσNKσK
(
σZ
Y
p
)σZ
= α(1− l)σLNσNKσKσσZZ Y σZp−σZ
Y
Y σZ
= α(1− l)σLNσNKσKσσZZ p−σZ
Y 1−σZ = ...
Y = α
1
1−σZ (1− l)
σL
1−σZN
σN
1−σZK
σK
1−σZ σ
σZ
1−σZ
Z p
− σZ
1−σZ
Substitute Y equation above into the q˙ equation:
q˙ = rq − (q − 1)
2
2h
− σK α
1
1−σZ (1− l)
σL
1−σZN
σN
1−σZK
σK
1−σZ σ
σZ
1−σZ
Z p
− σZ
1−σZ
K
= ...− σKα
1
1−σZ (1− l)
σL
1−σZN
σN
1−σZK
σK
1−σZ −1σ
σZ
1−σZ
Z p
− σZ
1−σZ
= ...− ...N
σN
1−σZK
σK−1+σZ
1−σZ ...
= ...− ...
(
K
N
σN
1−σK−σZ
)σK−1+σZ
1−σZ
...
q˙ = rq − (q − 1)
2
2h
− σKα
1
1−σZ (1− l)
σL
1−σZ k
σK+σZ−1
1−σZ σ
σZ
1−σZ
Z p
− σZ
1−σZ
= rq − (q − 1)
2
2h
− σKα
1
1−σZ (1− l)
σZ
1−σZ (p−1σZ)
σZ
1−σZ k
σK+σZ−1
1−σZ
Derivation of Equation (4.23): From equation (4.19),
θγ
l˙
l
= β − r + γn− (γ − 1)C˙
C
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Plug in equation (4.20),
θγ
l˙
l
= β − r + γn− (γ − 1)
(
Y˙
Y
+
l˙
l
+
l˙
1− l
)
= β − r + γn− (γ − 1) Y˙
Y
− (γ − 1) l˙
l
− (γ − 1) l˙
1− l
θγl˙ = (β − r + γn)l − (γ − 1)l Y˙
Y
− (γ − 1)l˙ − (γ − 1) l
1− l l˙[
θγ + (γ − 1) + (γ − 1) l
1− l
]
l˙ = (β − r + γn)l − (γ − 1)l Y˙
Y
Plug in equation (4.21),
... = (β − r + γn)l − (γ − 1)l
(
− σL
1− σZ
l˙
1− l +
σN
1− σZ n+
σK
1− σZ
q − 1
h
)
... = ...− (γ − 1)l σK
1− σZ
q − 1
h
+ (γ − 1) σL
1− σZ
l
1− l l˙ − (γ − 1)l
σN
1− σZ n
[
θγ + (γ − 1) + (γ − 1) l
1− l − (γ − 1)
σL
1− σZ
l
1− l
]
l˙
= (β − r + γn)l − (γ − 1)l σK
1− σZ
q − 1
h
− (γ − 1)l σN
1− σZ n
[
θγ + γ − 1
l
+ (γ − 1) 1
1− l − (γ − 1)
σL
1− σZ
1
1− l
]
l˙
= (β − r + γn)− (γ − 1) σK
1− σZ
q − 1
h
− (γ − 1) σN
1− σZ n
[
γ(θ + 1)− 1
l
+
γ − 1
1− l
(
1− σL
1− σZ
)]
l˙ = β − r + γn− γ − 1
1− σZ
(
σK
q − 1
h
− σNn
)
[
1− γ(θ + 1)
l
+
1− γ
1− l
(
1− σL
1− σZ
)]
l˙ = r − β − γn− 1− γ
1− σZ
(
σK
q − 1
h
− σNn
)
F (l)l˙ = r − β − γn− 1− γ
1− σZ
(
σK
q − 1
h
− σNn
)
l˙ =
1
F (l)
[
r − β − γn− 1− γ
1− σZ
(
σK
q − 1
h
− σNn
)]
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Derivation of Equation (4.24):
k˙ =
(
q˜ − 1
h
− g
)
k˜ = 0
q˜ − 1
h
− g = 0
q˜ − 1
h
= g
q˜ − 1 = gh
q˜ = 1 + gh
Derivation of Equation (4.25):
q˙ = rq˜ − (q˜ − 1)
2
2h
− σKα
1
1−σZ (1− l˜)
σZ
1−σZ (p−1σZ)
σZ
1−σZ k˜
σK+σZ−1
1−σZ = 0
= r(1 + gh)− (1 + gh− 1)
2
2h
− σKα
1
1−σZ (1− l˜)
σZ
1−σZ (p−1σZ)
σZ
1−σZ k˜
σK+σZ−1
1−σZ = 0
= r(1 + gh)− g
2h2
2h
− ...
= r(1 + gh)− g
2h
2
− σKα
1
1−σZ (1− l˜)
σZ
1−σZ (p−1σZ)
σZ
1−σZ k˜
σK+σZ−1
1−σZ = 0
k˜ and l˜ are jointly determined by the equation above.
r(1 + gh)− g
2h
2
= σKα
1
1−σZ (1− l˜)
σZ
1−σZ (p−1σZ)
σZ
1−σZ k˜
σK+σZ−1
1−σZ
[
r(1 + gh)− g
2h
2
]
σ−1K α
− 1
1−σZ (1− l˜)−
σZ
1−σZ (p−1σZ)
− σZ
1−σZ = k˜
σK+σZ−1
1−σZ
[
r(1 + gh)− g
2h
2
] 1−σZ
σK+σZ−1
σ
− 1−σZ
σK+σZ−1
K α
− 1
σK+σZ−1 (1− l˜)−
σZ
σK+σZ−1 (p−1σZ)
− σZ
σK+σZ−1 = k˜
k˜ =
[
r(1 + gh)− g
2h
2
] 1−σZ
σK+σZ−1
σ
− 1−σZ
σK+σZ−1
K α
− 1
σK+σZ−1 (1− l˜)−
σZ
σK+σZ−1 (p−1σZ)
− σZ
σK+σZ−1
Derivation of a11, a12, a13, a33:
a11 = r − 2(q − 1)
2h
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= r − q − 1
h
= r − g
a12 = −σKα
1
1−σZ (1− l˜)
σL
1−σZ (p−1σZ)
σZ
1−σZ
σK + σZ − 1
1− σZ k˜
σK+σZ−1
1−σZ −1
= −σK(σK + σZ − 1)
1− σZ α
1
1−σZ (1− l˜)
σZ
1−σZ (p−1σZ)
σZ
1−σZ k˜
σK+σZ−1−1+σZ
1−σZ
= ...k˜
2σZ−2+σK
1−σZ
= ...k˜
σK
1−σZ −2
a12 = −σK(σK + σZ − 1)
1− σZ α
1
1−σZ (1− l˜)
σZ
1−σZ (p−1σZ)
σZ
1−σZ k˜
σK
1−σZ −2
a13 = −σKα
1
1−σZ
σL
1− σZ (1− l˜)
σZ
1−σZ −1(−1)(p−1σZ)
σZ
1−σZ k˜
σK+σZ−1
1−σZ
=
σKσZσL
1− σZ α
1
1−σZ (1− l˜)
2σZ−1
1−σZ (p−1σZ)
σZ
1−σZ k˜
σK+σZ−1
1−σZ
a33 = −1− γ
F (l˜)2
[
g − 1
1− σZ (σK
q − 1
h
− σNn)
]
F ′(l˜)
where
F (l˜) =
1− γ(θ + 1)
l
+
1− γ
1− l (1−
σL
1− σZ )
So
F ′(l˜) = −1− γ(θ + 1)
l2
+
1− γ
(1− l)2 (1−
σL
1− σZ )
Thus
a33 =
1− γ
F (l˜)2
[g − 1
1− σZ (σK
q − 1
h
− σNn)][1− γ(θ + 1)
l2
− 1− γ
(1− l)2 (1−
σL
1− σZ )]
Derivation of Equation (4.26):
Z = σZ
Y
p
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p
Z
ZσZ
= σZα(1− l)σLNσNKσKp−1
Z1−σZ = ...
Z = σ
1
1−σZ
Z α
1
1−σZ (1− l)
σL
1−σZN
σN
1−σZK
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− 1
1−σZ
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1
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1−σZ
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1
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1−σZN
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Derivation of Equation (4.27):
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1−σK−σZ
=
(p−1ασZ)
1
1−σZ (1− l)
σL
1−σZK
σK
1−σZN
σN
1−σZ
N
σN
1−σK−σZ
= ...N
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σN (1−σK−σZ )−σN (1−σZ )
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1−σZN
−σNσK
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K
N
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1−σK−σZ
) σK
1−σZ
= ...k
σK
1−σZ
z = (p−1ασZ)
1
1−σZ (1− l)
σL
1−σZ k
σK
1−σZ
Derivation of Equation (4.28):
Y = α(1− l)σLNσNKσKZσZ
= α(1− l)σLNσNKσK (σZ Y
p
)σZ
= ...σσZZ Y
σZp−σZ
Y
Y σZ
= α(1− l)σLNσNKσKσσZZ p−σZ
Y 1−σZ = ...
Y = α
1
1−σZ (1− l)
σL
1−σZN
σN
1−σZK
σK
1−σZ (σZp
−1)
σZ
1−σZ
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= ...(p−1σZ)
σZ
1−σZ
Y = α
1
1−σZ (1− l)
σL
1−σZ (p−1σZ)
σZ
1−σZK
σK
1−σZN
σN
1−σZ
Derivation of Equation (4.29):
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Derivation of Equation (4.30):
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σZ
σK + σZ − 1
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p
− σZ
σK + σZ − 1
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σZ
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(
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p
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p
+
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)
Derivation of Equation (4.31):
dz˜
z˜
= − 1
1− σZ
dp
p
+
σL
1− σZ
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σK
1− σZ
dk˜
k˜
= − 1
1− σZ
dp
p
− σL
1− σZ
dl˜
1− l˜ +
σK
1− σZ
σZ
σK + σZ − 1(
dp
p
+
dl˜
1− l˜ )
= − 1
1− σZ
dp
p
− σL
1− σZ
dl˜
1− l˜ +
σK
1− σZ
σZ
σK + σZ − 1
dp
p
+
σK
1− σZ
σZ
σK + σZ − 1
dl˜
1− l˜
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= − 1
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Derivation of Equation (4.32):
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Chapter5
Canada’s Loss of External
Competitiveness: The Role of
Commodity Prices and the
Emergence of China
Abstract1
After booming in the 1990s, Canadian exports have waned over the past decade.
The loss of external competitiveness has been quite evident in the US market
(the main destination of Canadian exports), where Canada has been overtaken by
China as the leading exporter to the US. Using a dynamic panel data of Canadian
merchandise exports across different sectors in the US market, we identify the
main driving forces behind the weakening export performance in Canada, which
include the slowdown in the US demand and the emergence of China as a major
exporter. The appreciation of the Canadian loonie over the past decade, in part
reflecting the rise in commodity prices, has also played a key role in explaining
the loss of Canadian exporters’ share in the US market.
JEL Classification: F14, F31.
Key Words: commodity currency, Dutch disease, real effective exchange rate.
1joint with Paulo Medas (IMF)
100
5.1 Introduction
Canadian exports have been on a roller coast over the last two decades, surging
from 22 percent of its GDP in 1990 to 40 percent by end-2000, and falling to 24
percent of GDP in 2010. Importantly, the composition of exports changed signifi-
cantly as not all sectors were affected equally. The rise in exports in the 1990s was
widespread, but the expansion in manufacturing was particularly impressive. Af-
ter 2000, the fall in exports as a share of GDP was predominantly concentrated in
manufacturing, while energy exports continued to expand and now represent about
25 percent of all merchandise exports (versus less than 10 percent in the 1990s).
While exporters benefited from a depreciation of the Canadian real effective ex-
change rate (REER) in the 1990s, commodity prices surged in the 2000s and were
accompanied by a large appreciation of the REER. This has led to a debate on
whether Canada’s loss of external competitiveness reflects some degree of “Dutch
disease” phenomenon - in the sense that the rise in commodity exports, partly
due to a temporary surge in commodity prices, explains the large appreciation of
the currency and the subpar performance of manufacturing exports - or whether
other factors, namely the increasing productivity gap vis-a-vis its trade partners
and ‘globalization forces’ (e.g. the emergence of China and other economies), have
played a greater role.
The striking deterioration in the Canadian export performance is likely due to
several factors, as will be argued in this paper. It is nevertheless important to
assess to what extent the recent commodity boom affected non-commodity firms’
ability to compete. This is particularly relevant given that energy production
and exports could potentially be more than doubled over the next decade or so,
bringing with it new policy challenges. The development of the large reserves of
non-renewable resources can generate important benefits for the country by rais-
ing exports, domestic income, and improving the standard of living. At the same
time, commodity-rich countries face unique challenges that in some cases demand
a re-thinking of the policy framework. To some degree, the domestic economy will
have to continue to undertake a structural adjustment as Canada becomes more
specialized in commodities - e.g. non-commodity sectors will have to adjust to
persistently stronger currency and will likely represent a smaller share of exports
and value-added in the economy. Another common challenge is how to buffer the
economy from the boom-bust cycles in commodity prices, which could lead to
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persistent negative impacts on the non-commodity economy and result in lower
welfare - in this regard economic policy can play a role in reducing the negative
spillovers (see Medas and Zakharova, 2009). It is in this context that this paper
looks at the key drivers of Canadian exports, with a special focus on commodities.
In recent years, there has been a renewed interest in studying the links between
commodity prices, the exchange rate, and manufacturing production in Canada. A
recent OECD (2012) report argues that the decline in central Canada’s manufac-
turing base is correlated to the appreciation in the Canadian dollar (and the large
increase in commodity prices). Beine, Bos, and Coulombe (2009) adopt a new ap-
proach to extract the commodity-price components from observed exchange rates
and prices, and estimate that 42 percent of the manufacturing employment loss in
Canada was due to exchange rate developments between 2002 and 2007. Shakeri,
Gray, and Leonard (2012) make the argument that although there is evidence of
“Dutch disease” effects, they seem to be relatively limited and not likely to be the
only explanation for the loss of external competitiveness. The Bank of Canada
has also argued that while the rise in commodity prices has had a substantial
impact on the exchange rate over the past decade, the decline of manufacturing
(as a share of GDP) is largely a process that started well before the recent boom
in commodity prices and is common to other advanced economies. (See Carney
(2012).)
This paper takes a new look at the causes of Canada’s subpar export growth
over the last decade by focusing on the performance of Canadian exporters in
the US market. Since 2001, non-commodity exports to its neighbor have stag-
nated and, as a consequence, Canada’s share of US imports has steadily declined.
By looking at the US market, the destination for the vast majority of Canadian
exports, the analysis can be focused on how different factors have affected the
ability of Canadian firms to compete. As such, the paper is in a better position
to ascertain how much of the decline in manufacturing was due to loss in exports
competitiveness, and in particular, how much is related to the appreciation of the
exchange rate and the boom in commodity prices. The empirical analysis starts
by discussing the sensitivity of the Canadian exchange rate to commodity prices
(energy and metals). We then investigate the extent to which the weaker Cana-
dian export reflects the stronger Canadian dollar or other factors, using panel data
for US imports by sectors. The detailed panel data allows us to better identify
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the impact of the exchange rate (and commodity prices) per sector and control
for the emergence of China as a major exporter to the US market, while avoiding
the potential bias associated with export data at an aggregate level.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides
an overview of the trade dynamics over the last decades, with a special focus on
Canadian exports to its southern neighbor. In Section 6.3, we examine the link-
age between commodity prices and the exchange rate. Section 6.4 identifies the
main reasons behind Canadian exporters’ loss of market share in the US market
(especially the manufacturing sector) by using panel data analysis. In Section 6.5,
we present key conclusions and discuss some policy options.
5.2 Canadian Exports Dynamics
5.2.1 Boom in the 1990s and stagnation in the 2000s
After booming in the 1990s, as firms benefited from the strong US demand, Cana-
dian exports weakened considerably over the last decade. During the 1990s, export
volumes expanded at a robust pace of an annual average of 8.5 percent, boosted
by strong US imports growth (at an average of 10 percent on an annual basis).
The free trade agreements with the US (CUFTA in 1989, replaced with NAFTA
in 1994), have also likely helped to preserve Canada’s position as the leading ex-
porter to its southern neighbor throughout the 1990s (Romalis, 2005). However,
the export performance deteriorated materially after 2000, with export growth
stagnating up to 2007 and contracting sharply during the time of the financial cri-
sis in 2008-09. Non-energy exports have been affected the most, remaining below
their 2000 volume levels at the end of 2011; whilst energy exports have continued
to expand albeit at a slower pace. (See Figures 1 and 2).
The recent loss of external competitiveness has been felt across many sectors in
Canada, with the manufacturing sector being the most severely hit. After reach-
ing a high in 2000, the two largest Canadian export sectors - automotive and
machinery & equipment, have never fully recovered from the US recession in 2001.
In particular, they stagnated until 2006-07, and suffered another adverse shock
during the 2008-09 global crisis. (See Figure 3). The forestry industry has also
experienced a collapse, reflecting the crisis in the US housing sector, and at the
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end of 2011 its export volumes remained 35 percent below 2000 levels. On the
other hand, Canadian energy exports have continued to expand and were up 25
percent during the same period, benefiting from new discoveries and the opening
up of market by its southern neighbor.
5.2.2 The importance of US markets to Canadian exporters
The development in the US markets has played a key role in the change of for-
tune for Canadian exporters. The US has by far been the largest destination for
Canadian products, absorbing more than 75 percent of Canadian exports in the
past decades. As such, it is natural that a weakening US demand is part of the
explanation for the challenges faced by Canadian exporters in recent years. In
particular, the growth of US import volumes decelerated from around 10 percent
a year in the 1990s to 4.5 percent annually during the period of 2000-07. Over
the same period, Canada’s annual non-energy export growth also fell to a meager
1.5 percent. During more recent years, Canadian exporters have been affected by
the international crisis in 2008-09 as well, further exacerbating the loss in external
markets, for example, non-energy export volumes in 2011 remained 12 percent
below 2000 levels.
Canadian firms have also faced a significant loss of market share in US mar-
kets. Canada used to be the uncontested leading exporter to the US until 2005.
Between 1999 and 2011, Canada’s market share declined by 5 percentage points
to 14.33 percent of total US imports. This loss is equivalent to 6.5 percent of
Canada’s GDP, during which time China took over as the main exporter to the
US. (See Figure 5). The case of manufacturing exports (e.g. machinery and trans-
port equipment or manufactured products) is particularly striking and relevant,
given their relative importance. (See Figures A1-A9). Namely, while Canadian
exports represented 19 percent of the total machinery and transport equipment
imports by the US in 1999, their share fell to 10.5 percent by 2011. As a conse-
quence, while machinery and transport equipment accounted for close to half of
Canadian exports to the US in 1999, by 2011 they represented just slightly more
than a third. In comparison, Chinese market share surged from 5.5 percent to
25.5 percent in the US manufacturing market during the same period.
A key question is what factors explain Canada’s declining external competitive-
ness. Even after taking into account the slowdown in US demand, the substantial
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loss of market share, in addition to the limited success in diversifying to other
markets, suggests that there are other underlying causes for the loss of competi-
tiveness. A potential explanation, being raised frequently in recent years, is the
impact of the sharp rise in commodity prices, which likely fuelled the substantial
appreciation of the Canadian exchange rate hurting manufacturing exports. This
effect is likely to be of more importance after 2000 given the rising volumes of
energy exports and their prices (in addition to metals). Other factors have also
likely played important roles, including the increasing productivity gap relative
to key competitors (Figure 6) and tighter competition from emerging economies
(e.g. the emergence of China as a world exporter). In the next two sections, we
test formally some of these hypotheses.
5.3 The Exchange Rate and Commodity Prices
This section discusses the sensitivity of the Canadian exchange rate to commodity
prices. In particular, we examine the long-term relationship between the Cana-
dian exchange rate and commodity prices. Figure 7 does indeed suggest that the
movement of the Canadian real effective exchange rate (REER), especially during
more recent periods, seems to be highly correlated with the movements of metal
and energy prices in real terms. If the relationship is statistically significant and
robust, it would be further evidence in favor of potential “Dutch disease” effects
in light of the weak manufacturing export performance.
There are several studies discussing to what degree the Canadian dollar has be-
come a commodity currency. A seminal paper by Amano and van Norden (1995)
suggests that there was a negative relationship between energy prices and the rel-
ative strength of the Canadian dollar over the period of 1973-1993. By “negative”,
we mean that a rise in energy prices leads to a depreciation of the Canadian dollar
versus the US dollar. Note that most studies focused on the bilateral exchange
rate between Canada and the US, while we focus on the real effective exchange
rate; nevertheless the conclusions should not differ substantially, given that the
US remains the major trading partner for Canada.
However, more recent papers argue that this negative relationship has reversed
over the past decade or so. For instance, Issa, Lafrance, and Murray (2006) find a
positive relationship between the price of energy and the exchange rate from the
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1990s onwards. The Bank of Canada argued that the rise in commodity prices
accounted for about one half of the appreciation over the past decade. Moreover,
other studies have also shown a positive relationship between energy and metal
prices, and the exchange rate once we take into account the weight of energy and
metals on total exports (one would expect greater correlation between the two
when energy export volumes are relatively large). For example, Bayoumi and
Muhleisen (2006) find that both energy and non-energy commodity prices have
put some upward pressure on the Canadian exchange rate.
Our empirical analysis is in line with previous studies; however, we differ by fo-
cusing on the Canadian REER, which tends to be more relevant when analyzing
trade competitiveness (the main goal of this paper).
Given that some variables of our interest may not be exogenous, we use a sys-
tem VECM. Other papers tend to use a single error-correction equation, as they
assume that the causality only goes one direction - from commodity prices to the
exchange rate.
In order to test for a long-run equilibrium relationship between the real effec-
tive exchange rate and the commodity prices, we specify a vector error-correction
model (ECM) as follows:
∆REERt = α(REERt−1 − β1Penergyt−1 − β2Pmetalst−1 − β3Productivityt−1)
+γ1∆REERt−1 + γ2∆Penergyt−1 + γ3∆Pmetalst−1
+γ4∆Productivityt−1 + γ5spreadt−4
where: ∆REER, ∆Penergy, ∆Pmetals, and ∆Productivity are the first differences
of the logged Canadian real effective exchange rate, real energy prices, real metal
prices, and an index of Canada-US productivity differential, respectively.
The terms in the bracket are the co-integrating equation, measuring the devia-
tion of the system from its long-run equilibrium relationship. The ADF unit root
tests confirm that the REER, commodity prices, and the Canada-US productivity
differential index have unit roots at levels. In comparison, the Canada-US interest
rate spread is found to be a stationary process. We test for co-integration using
the system-approach developed by Johansen (1988), which confirms that there is
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a co-integration relationship at the 5 percent significance level.
The coefficient α is the error-correction parameter, which measures the adjust-
ment speed of the exchange rate and other endogenous variables towards their
long-run equilibrium. The spread variable is the Canada-US interest rate spread.
(See Appendix for a detailed definition of the variables and data used.)
The regression also includes a measure of labor productivity in Canada relative
to that in the US, which serves as a proxy for Canada’s productivity gap with
the trading partners of the US. According to the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson hy-
pothesis, it is expected that a persistent rise in productivity growth relative to the
rest of the world will lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate. Corsetti,
Dedola, and Leduc (2005) report that in the face of a productivity shock, the real
exchange rate did appreciate in the US and Japan, but depreciated in Italy and
the UK, with mixed evidence on Germany.
Our VECM results (see Table 1) confirm that there is a positive long-run re-
lationship between the Canadian REER, and both the energy and metal prices.
The estimated long-run impacts (based on the quarterly sample) suggest that a
1 percent increase in the price of energy will lead to around 0.11-0.16 percent
appreciation of the Canadian REER, whilst a 1 percent rise in the price of metals
will result in a 0.38-0.49 percent appreciation of the Canadian REER. For exam-
ple, the real energy prices grew by 60 percent between 2000 and 2007, and as
such, the REER would be expected to appreciate by almost 10 percent. While
significant, the estimates are somewhat lower than other recent estimates in the
literature. Shakeri, Gray, and Leonard (2012) argue that for the post-2004 period,
the exchange rate become more sensitive to commodity prices. They find that a
1 percent increase in energy prices would lead to an appreciation of 0.5 percent
(and 0.7 percent for non-energy commodities). However, their finding is based
on a limited sample (1992Q1-2007Q4) and focuses on Canada’s bilateral exchange
rate with the US.
Building from that, we also test the relationship between commodity prices and
exchange rate by using a composite commodity price index (as a weighted aver-
age of metals and energy prices). The results (column IV in Table) confirm that
there is a strong relationship between commodity prices and the exchange rate. In
107
particular, a 1 percent increase in commodity prices would result in a 0.4 percent
appreciation of the REER. This impact would be somewhat lower, if we include
more recent period of the financial crisis into our sample under study. (See column
V in Table 1.) Given that the composite commodity price index rose by 62 percent
between 2000 and 2007, the expected appreciation in the Canadian exchange rate
would be close to 25 percent.
On top of that, we find some weak evidence of a long-run impact of productiv-
ity gap (between Canada and US) as suggested by the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson
hypothesis. However, the estimated impact is relatively small and is not robust
across samples. In the case of Canada, the fall in the productivity gap between
2000 and 2007 would imply a depreciation of 0.5 percent. In reality, the REER did
not depreciate to compensate for the loss of productivity, as the effect of the com-
modity prices dominated and led to a substantial appreciation in the Canadian
dollar. The relatively weak productivity growth in both advanced economies (e.g.
US and Germany) and emerging markets (e.g. China and Mexico) have posted
stronger productivity gains over the last decade, which has made Canadian firms
more vulnerable to the appreciation of its currency and adverse economic shocks.
The regressions using higher frequency data after controlling for market volatil-
ity (as measured by the VIX index) are broadly in line with the results for the
quarterly data. Periods of high market volatility may also be associated with
large fluctuations in commodity prices, which potentially affect the estimates of
the REER’s sensitivity to commodity prices. The results (Table 1, columns VI
and VII) confirm the effect of commodities prices on the REER. However, the re-
gressions provide limited clues regarding the impact of the changes in the VIX on
the Canadian REER. A positive relationship would indicate to us that investors
perceive Canada as a safe haven during periods of market turmoil. There was
some evidence of such an effect, but the results were only statistically significant
at 10 percent and only for some specifications. (Note that a statistically signifi-
cant negative estimate in the co-integrating equation indicates that over time the
Canadian dollar would appreciate in response to a higher VIX). The lack of ro-
bustness may be related to the fact that the status as a safe haven is thought to
be a relatively recent phenomenon.
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5.4 Canadian Exports in the US Market
5.4.1 Methodology and Data
In this section, we conduct a dynamic panel data analysis to quantify the factors
that have been the main driving forces behind Canada’s loss of market share in
the US. Following the discussion above, the focus will be on the movements of the
exchange rate, driven by commodities prices, and the increased competition from
the emergence of China in international trade.
A challenge, faced by other studies trying to identify the impact of movements
in the exchange rate on manufacturing, is the need to differentiate those effects
from the factor(s) driving the structural declining weight of the sector in advanced
economies. The relatively weaker performance of manufacturing in Canada can be
partly linked to a loss of external competitiveness vis-a-vis its trade partners (e.g.
appreciation of the currency, weaker productivity growth). However, it may also
reflect other forces, especially the common factors that have also affected other
advanced economies (possibly linked to the effects of globalization). By looking
at a panel data of imports to the US markets, we are able to better identify the
factors that have hurt Canadian firms’ competitiveness in their main destination
market, and quantify which sectors have been the most affected. The focus is on
market shares (instead of actual trade volumes), as it already adjusts for potential
effects due to changes in the US demand that affect all exporters.
In addition, the methodology used allows us to better isolate the different fac-
tors, such as the increasing competition from China, since it has emerged as a
large exporter in the US market. The sector-level trade data allow us to identify
not only the overall effect on Canadian exports, but also which specific sectors
(e.g. manufacturing) are more exposed to the movements in the exchange rate (or
commodity prices) and/or competition from China.
Our empirical specification is as follows:
CANi,t = β1REERt + β2
∑
t
CHNi,t + β3
∑
t
Xt (5.1)
where: CANi,t represents the Canadian share of US imports of good i at time t,
REERt is the Canadian real effective exchange rate, CHNi,t is the Chinese share
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of US imports of good i at time t; Xt is a vector of control variables, including
Canadian domestic demand, US GDP growth, and the dummies for the introduc-
tion of CUFTA/NAFTA.2
Statistically significant coefficients for the exchange rate would provide a mea-
sure of the exchange rate impact on the Canadian market share in the US market.
A significant negative relationship for sector i indicates that an appreciation would
result in a loss of market share in that sector and would be evidence in support
of “Dutch disease” effects, given that the results in the previous section suggest
commodity prices have been the key driver of the movements in the Canadian
exchange rate. We focus in particular on the manufacturing sector. In addition,
for some regressions we will include commodity prices as an instrument for the
exchange rate, which would reinforce the evidence in favor if (or against) “Dutch
disease”-type effects.
The inclusion of China’s share as a dependent variable will also help to iden-
tify or control for the effect of China’s emergence as a large player in international
trade over the last decades, which was a significant exogenous shock to Canada
(and other countries). As discussed by Cerra and Saxena (2002), Lardy (2004),
and Rodrik (2006), China’s emergence likely reflects Chinese government’s own
economic reform policies, which are exogenous to others.
The regressions use imports data at 4-digit levels of the SITC (Standard In-
ternational Trade Classification) over the period from 1975 to 2010; however,
the analysis is mainly centered on the pre-2008 period to exclude the effects of
the international financial crisis; nevertheless we also present the results for the
larger sample. The main regressions use data on manufacturing imports, which is
constructed by including manufactured goods (SITC6), machinery and transport
equipment (SITC7), and miscellaneous manufactured articles (SITC8). See data
appendix for more details.
2CUFTA is a free-trade agreement (FTA) between Canada and the United States, entered in
1989. NAFTA, replaced CUFTA since 1994, is a free-trade agreement (FTA) among Canada, the
United States, and Mexico. Romalis (2005) shows that CUFTA and NAFTA had a substantial
impact on international trade volumes. Holding constant the total import volumes from the rest
of the world, this implies that the Canada’s share in the US market is expected to increase due
to the implementation of CUFTA and NAFTA.
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5.4.2 The Results
The dynamic panel analysis is based on GMM estimators suggested by Arellano
and Bond (1991), as they ensure efficiency and consistency provided that the mod-
els are not subject to serial correlation of order two, and that the set of instrument
variables used are valid (tested using Sargent-Hansen tests).3 The use of GMM
will help to address potential issues related to autocorrelation, especially as we
have a small T (time series) relative to a large N (cross section).
In addition, to avoid potential problems from excessive number of instruments,
we keep the number of lag instruments for the endogenous variables less than
the number of groups. A potential problem with the GMM estimation method
developed by Arellano and Bond (but also common to others) is that large num-
ber of instruments can lead to over-fitting bias of instrumented variables. The
Arellano-Bond estimator potentially uses as instruments all the lagged informa-
tion contained in the sample and increases the risk of over-fitting biases especially
in cases where T (period units) is large. To reduce that risk, the regressions keep
the lag periods instruments less than the number of groups. See Rodman (2009)
and Arellano (2003) for further details.
Furthermore, we also test for the robustness of the results using additional and/or
alternative instrument variables as will be discussed.
Non-Energy Exports
We first present a brief summary of the results for all non-energy exports, but
the main discussion will center on the results for the manufacturing sector. The
econometric results indicate that an appreciation of the REER puts downward
pressure on the Canadian non-energy share in the US market. In particular, for
the small sample (1975-2007), a 10 percent appreciation of the REER drives down
the Canadian non-energy imports share by about 0.6 percentage points on average
(Table 2). The estimated impact is somewhat larger when the regressions include
commodity (energy and metals) or energy prices as instrument variables for the
REER. This suggests that the rise in commodity prices was key in driving the loss
of market share associated with the exchange rate appreciation. The results for
the larger sample (1975-2010) show an even stronger impact of movements in the
3All regressions are tested for the presence of autocorrelation of order two.
111
exchange rate (and commodity prices) on Canada’s market share (Table 2b). A
10 percent appreciation would lead to 0.8-0.9 percentage points fall in Canada’s
market share.
As conjectured, the competition effect from China is also significant. The Cana-
dian non-energy import share falls by an estimated 13 basis points for every 1
percentage point increase in the Chinese share (Table 2). It is worthwhile noting
that the estimates are based on a sample of disaggregated 4-digit import data,
which provides a more robust measure of the impact of China than if we had
used aggregate data on Canadian imports to the US. In reality, regressions for the
different import groups do show that the impact of China varies considerably -
in some cases being statistically significant (where both countries compete) while
in others the impact is not significant. The results confirm the premise that the
emergence of China in international trade had a significant impact (in some sec-
tors) that is not being captured by movements in the exchange rate. Namely, the
regressions captured the effect of changes in the REER (or relative prices), but
do not capture the effect from a new entrant in the market that has a significant
relatively lower price level (as China). By including Chinas share, we control for
that effect.
In addition, other control variables have the expected effects. A stronger Cana-
dian domestic demand drives down its exports, whilst Canadian firms benefited
from the introduction of CUFTA.
Manufacturing Exports
We now turn to the manufacturing sector, where the evidence points to an even
stronger impact of the exchange rate on Canada’s market share (Table 3). In
particular, a 10 percent increase in the REER results in a decline in the Canadian
share in the US market by almost 0.9 percentage points (columns III and IV). To
provide a sense of the magnitude involved, this elasticity suggests that the appre-
ciation of the REER between 1999 and 2007 (close to 32 percent) would result in
a fall of Canada’s market share by 2.9 percentage points - helping explain a large
proportion of the 4.5 percentage points in the actual fall during the period.
Additionally, to better identify the impact on the market share due to changes in
the REER associated with movements in the commodity prices, we added com-
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modity prices as an instrument variable. The estimated elasticities point to a
stronger impact of exchange rate movements when linked to movements in com-
modity prices on the market share (columns V and VI). The results reinforce the
argument that the rise in commodity prices, via REER appreciation, have played
an important role in constraining the ability of Canadian firms to compete abroad.
As was the case for the non-energy exports, the larger sample (1975-2010) shows
an even larger impact of the exchange rate and commodity prices on Canada’s
market share - a 10 percent appreciation would lead to a 1.5 percentage points of
fall in Canada’s market share.
Overall, the REER appreciation did have a material negative effect on Cana-
dian manufacturing exports. A simple counter-factual simulation shows that if
the REER had stayed constant between 2000 and 2007, the Canadian manufac-
turing share in the US market would have been about 22.5 percent higher than the
actual share in 2007. This would imply that export growth would have been higher
by about 2.25 percentage points every year between 1999 and 2007, and manu-
facturing exports would have been higher by about 2.5 percent of GDP in 2007.
While the appreciation of the exchange rate did not reflect only the commodity-
price boom, the evidence does suggest that the rise in energy and metal prices did
play a key role in putting upward pressure on the exchange rate, and dampening
growth in the manufacturing sector.
The rise of China as a major trade player also had an impact on Canadian man-
ufacturing exports. The results (Table 3, columns III to VI) indicate that a 1
percentage point increase in China’s market share led to a decline of about 13
basis points in Canada’s market share. While the elasticity may appear relatively
small, the impact on Canada was significant given the large rise in China’s share
over the last decades. In particular, China’s share in manufacturing rose by 14
percentage points between 1999 and 2007, which would imply, based on the esti-
mated elasticity, a drop of close to 1.9 percentage points in Canada’s market share.
As there could be a possibility that Canada and China shares are reacting to a
common shock, we tested the robustness of the results by introducing instrument
variables for the China share: the productivity lag between Canada and China
(column VII) and China productivity growth (column VIII). In both cases, the
estimated impact of China remains statistically significant and is even larger (1
percentage point increase in China’s share would lead to a fall in Canada’s share
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by 18-26 basis points). The larger sample (1975-2010) shows a somewhat larger
impact of China - a 1 percentage point increase in China’s share would lead to a
fall in Canada’s share by 17 basis points. This estimated elasticity would imply,
the China effect would explain about 40 percent of Canadas loss of market share
in the 2000-2011 period.
The other control variables tend to have the expected sign. The introduction
of CUFTA and NAFTA had a statistically significant positive (although small)
impact on Canada’s market share in most regressions. However, for regressions
where the China share was not included (columns I and II), the impact of the trade
agreements was negative. This may reflect the fact that when CUFTA/NAFTA
was implemented, it was also a period of robust rise in Chinese exports to the US.
By controlling for China’s exports, it is possible to better identify the effect of
the free-trade agreements. The domestic demand in Canada also tends to affect
exports negatively to the US, possibly due to a substitution effect (when domestic
market is strong, there is less incentive to export). Furthermore, we controlled for
potential effects of changes in the US economy as, despite the fact that we use
market share, it could be possible that changes in the US economy affect Canada
more than other countries. We did not find robust evidence of a statistically sig-
nificant impact although some specifications did suggest Canadian export share
was sensitive to changes in the US economy.
5.5 Conclusion and Policy Options
Canada’s waning export performance over the last decade reflects several factors,
including its high dependence on the US markets and exposure to commodity
prices. Exports as a share of GDP fell by 16 percentage points over the last
decade. In part, this reflects the very large share of exports destined to the US
market, making Canada highly exposed to developments in its southern neighbor.
As domestic demand slowed down in the US in the 2000s, so did Canadian ex-
ports. At the same time, Canada also lost significant market share in the US, with
material impact on exports and GDP.
Our findings indicate the loss of market share was due mainly to the large ex-
change rate appreciation, associated with rising commodity prices, and the emer-
gence of China in the world market. The exchange rate appreciated by 32 percent
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between 1999 and 2007, mostly driven by the large rise in commodity prices. In
turn, the analysis suggests that the appreciation of the currency explains close
to 2/3 of the loss in manufacturing market share in the same period.4 The in-
tegration of emerging economies to the international economy (especially China)
has also played an important role. Our estimates indicate that a 1 percentage
point increase in China’s market share led to a decline of about 13 basis points in
Canada’s market share - as China’s share in manufacturing rose by 14 percentage
points between 1999 and 2007, this helped explain a drop of more than 1.75 per-
centage points in Canada’s manufacturing market share.
The rising productivity gap relative to key trade competitors further hinders the
ability of Canadian exporters to adjust to the strengthening of its currency and the
stiffer competition from emerging markets. While Canadian firms would in any
case be affected by the appreciation of the currency and the emergence of China,
the weak productivity growth over the last decade has made it more difficult to
adjust. Further efforts to address the weak productivity growth and increase com-
petitiveness would help the structural adjustment by the non-commodity sectors -
that will need to continue as the energy sector is expected to expand substantially
and will likely put further upward pressure on the exchange rate.
The developments over the last decade also suggest that macro-fiscal policy will
need to take into account the growing importance of the commodity exports. The
share of the energy sector on the trade balance and GDP has grown, in part re-
flecting that Canada is becoming richer with the development of the vast natural
resources, but also implying that the economy is more exposed to large swings
in commodity prices. The non-energy trade balance is now significantly negative
(deficit of 4 percent of GDP, while in the 1990s was in surplus) and is dependent
on a large surplus on the energy trade balance. In reality, the increase in energy
exports reflects much more about the rise in oil prices than volume increases,
and as such, the positive impact (in incomes, export and fiscal revenues) could
be quickly reversed. As energy production and associated fiscal revenues are ex-
pected to expand substantially over the next decade, Canada will increasingly face
the same challenges faced by other commodity rich countries, especially regarding
fiscal policy and management. It will be increasingly relevant for governments,
4For a longer sample including the crisis, 1999-2011, the 37 percent appreciation explained
somewhat less than 60 percent of the loss in market share.
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especially for resource-rich provinces, to better integrate in the policy framework
an assessment of the effects of the greater dependence on commodities for the
economy and public accounts, including quantifying and managing key risks.
Appendix: Data Resources
A1. Time-Series Data (annual, quarterly, and monthly)
• Real effective exchange rate (REER) based on CPI : computed by the IMF.
• Commodity price index : The energy price index and metals price index are
from the Bank of Canada, with weights for price index from Canadian trade
data.
http://www.bankofcanada.ca/rates/price-indexes/bcpi/
We deflate the commodity price index by the US GDP deflator (from Haver
Analytics), to get the real commodity price index.
• Canada-US 3-month interest rate spread : based on the difference between
the 3-month Canadian Prime Corporate Paper and the US 3-month non-
financial commercial paper (both from Haver Analytics).
• Canada-US labor productivity differential : measured by GDP per person
employed in 2011 EKS dollar, computed by the Conference Board.
• Canada domestic demand : based on national accounts data. (Source: Haver)
A2. Panel Data (annual)
Standard International Trade Classification(SITC) data are from UN-Comtrade,
which are complied and documented in Feenstra et al. (2005).
- SITC0 = food and live animals.
- SITC1 = beverages and tobacco.
- SITC2 = crude materials and inedible except fuels.
- SITC3 = mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials.
- SITC4 = animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes.
- SITC5 = chemicals and related products.
- SITC6 = manufactured goods.
- SITC7 = machinery and transport equipment.
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- SITC8 = miscellaneous manufactured articles.
- SITC9 = commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere in the SITC.
We define the manufacturing sector to be SITC6, SITC7 and SITC8. The non-
energy sector is computed by excluding SITC3 from the SITC sectors.
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